So spitballing, my assumption is that it'd end up looking something like SSL certificate chains today. In the situation you mentioned: 1. The attacker wouldn'

So spitballing, my assumption is that it'd end up looking something like SSL certificate chains today. In the situation you mentioned: 1. The attacker wouldn't have access to the original cameras private key. 2. The attacker creates a fake video, creates a private key and signs the video with the key 3. The attacker tries to install the key into a camera Step 3 has to be made impossible. Meaning that a camera becomes a trusted entity and only allowed parties (ex the camera manufacturer) has the authority to insert a private key into a camera. This would be that after installing a camera with a new private key, the key would then need to be signed with the manufacturer's private key and also stored in the camera. This shows the manufacturer is responsible for the contents of the video. If someone tries to change the camera's private key it would no longer match what the manufacturer signed. Which yes then means we need to have authorized camera manufactures and a process for certificate revocation and all of that. The exact opposite of "free and open" for recording devices - and the only way we aren't flooded with fake videos flooding and seriously impacting society. We have to want this if we want to still have a concept of video evidence in either the justice or social spheres.