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Don’t be generous to Intel. I work in a vertical strategic to Intel, and get regularly called on by them and get NDA presentations and the ability to talk to en
by Spooky23 9y ago
Don’t be generous to Intel. I work in a vertical strategic to Intel, and get regularly called on by them and get NDA presentations and the ability to talk to engineers about strategic projects.
For this incident, I got an email a few hours after the embargo was lifted, that essentially said that it was no big deal and referenced public information. The purpose of the communication was to have people like me message up the chain that this was no big deal. That misdirection is inexcusable, particularly when they could have given meaningful guidance under NDA.
We had some follow up questions, which weren’t really answered. We were directed to hardware OEMs, as ETA for microcode updates are out of their control and according to Intel are the full responsibility of the OEM. In reality, Intel was struggling to deliver the code, and the OEMs we deal with issued patches in hours, and had to pull back updates due to Intel code revisions.
Personally, I do have alternatives for strategic parts of the business that drive high margin Intel sales. Many critical aspects of my business can run on Intel or Power platforms, and we can engineer solutions either way in similar cost footprints.
Less strategic aspects of the business, like end user compute now have niche competitors that can gobble up Intel business very quickly. Half of my desktop users run on VDI, mostly with AMD thin clients. 50% of my constituencies can run their core line of business functions on iOS. iPad with a keyboard could reduce my Intel desktop spend by 50-75% for 2-3 years.
- ryanlol 9y ago> purpose of the communication was to have people like me message up the chain that this was no big deal. That misdirection is inexcusable But perhaps this was no big deal. We've seen years of research suggesting that modern CPUs are full of issues like this. There's probably a good decade worth of papers on cache side channel attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448.pdf for example Perhaps the big deal is that there are still people who think they can safely run multiple different things on a single machine?
- rocqua 9y agoThe 'bombshell' of meltdown isn't about cache side-channel attacks. Instead, it is about the use of out-of-order execution (meltdown) and speculative execution (spectre) to get side effects. It doesn't matter much that these side effects happen to be cache state. For meltdown, it matters that page protection is essentially broken. For spectre it matters that speculation on indirect branches are essentially attacker controlled. Both attacks, in their practical form, use cache timing as the side-channel to extract information. But the surprise is the control over (as the paper calls them) 'transient executions'.
- ryanlol 9y agoYeah, I know. My point was that it is very well established that CPUs are full of issues similar enough to meltdown and spectre. Therefore it is foolish for anyone to assume that they can safely run untrusted code on a machine with secrets on it.
- jnwatson 9y agoThere’s a $250 billion cloud computing market that makes that assumption.
- computerex 9y agoI think you might be misunderstanding what the phrase "side channel attack" means. It's very difficult to protect against side-channel attacks, because of their very nature. There are a lot of ways someone can try to exploit a system and of course not all of them can be accounted for in advance. But not all side-channel attacks are practical, some are done for academic reasons and can only be done in controlled environments with contrived setup. like check this out: https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ > Here, we describe a new acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction attack, applicable to GnuPG's current implementation of RSA. The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts. So the seriousness of a side-channel attack is determined as a function of the impact of the exploit as well as how easy it is to carry out the exploit. Meltdown in particular is nasty because it is relatively easy exploit and is undetectable and affects a ridiculously large range of hardware. So it is actually a pretty big deal. Yes there are side-channel attacks against Intel CPU's, but this isn't just any old side-channel attack.
- avtar 9y agoThanks for sharing those details. Deferring to OEMs is such a copout given how they are most likely going to handle security issues: https://twitter.com/avtargill/status/951195158229463046?s=17 https://twitter.com/avtargill/status/951195158229463046?s=17 At this point it’s up to users to scour motherboard manufacturers’ clunky forums to determine if their platforms will ever receive patches. Given the severity of the issue this really should be handled with more accountability and with a greater sense of urgency.
- Spooky23 9y agoIt’s also a cop out as they were leaning on the assessments of the vulnerability as a medium risk information disclosure by many security analysts. That is accurate in many respects, but not in the context of a multi tenant environment or in places where different compliance standards are in play. It’s particularly obnoxious when you read about the heroic efforts that were put in place to put AWS, Azure and GCP right. If it was no big deal, why go through that?
- hux_ 9y agoI have seen the way Intel takes care of its important customers first hand. They are as pro as it gets. You won't find anyone better.
- Spooky23 9y agoI’m sure that’s true, and it’s great if you’re the army or Amazon. I’ve read Andy Grove’s account of the thinking behind the response to the Pentium math bug. I expect better from Intel. As a customer somewhere between an individual PC builder and Amazon web services, I don’t think they handled this incident well at all.
- lima 9y agoI'm also under Intel NDA and it took them days to provide any meaningful guidance at all. The only useful thing in these documents was a timeline/detailed list for the microcode patches, all of which should be public. They also claim that Spectre/Meltdown are "not a bug or flaw in Intel products" and their slide deck has a whole slide dedicated to forward-looking statement disclaimers. Sigh. Needless to say, we're not impressed.
- Simon_says 9y agoThey know what they're saying is bull hockey, but they have to say it, otherwise they'll lose their lawsuits. They have to be able to point to the public spec and say "See!? We're completely in spec! No bugs here." Nevermind that the bug is in the spec.