4 ms·

tor isn't a VPN service, it's an anonymizer. The end node could still sniff your traffic presumably.

• drdrey 9y ago
  Yeah but that would protect you from the insecure wifi attacker, no?
  • IncRnd 9y ago
    No, it wouldn't. You still need to protect that you are connecting to the wifi access point and not a spoofed one, due to arp or DNS poisoning.
    • icebraining 9y ago
      Why? Protocols like Tor and HTTPS include authentication layers just to make sure your connection is secured even over an insecure channel.
      • IncRnd 9y ago
        Great question. I used the word "to" when it is more correct to use "thru" the AP. You need https for cert pinning, so when I mentioned cert pinning that automatically included https. The reason to pin the certificate is to ensure that the server certificate presented today is the same server certificate that was seen yesterday. Otherwise the server may be spoofed and still pass the certificate checks. This is generally mitigated via certificate pinning. See Twitter's history and implementation of such. I am not saying to NOT use another layer on top of this, as defense in depth is always important. There are ways to get around VPN use and ways to get around cert pinning, but using both makes the attacker's job far more difficult. Implementing cert pinning is something that needs to be done by app developers, and what you mention are definitely good first measures one should take to protect their OWN systems in a hostile environment. By themselves, though, they don't completely mitigate all threats in the threat model.
        • icebraining 9y ago
          Right, but Tor itself includes their own implementation of "cert pinning", so you are protected from an insecure Wifi network by using it (of course, you are then at the mercy of the exit node, but that's another matter).
          • IncRnd 9y ago
            Agreed, if the pinning extends from the client to outside the 'cafe' then that traffic is protected against modification from within the cafe. I'm a little suspect that they have their own implementation, which might be incomplete, but it is likely better than no pinning. By Tor, do you mean the firefox browser fork or Tor itself?
            • icebraining 9y ago
              I mean Tor itself. It uses TLS to connect securely to the nodes. The code includes a list of Directory Servers, along with the fingerprints of their certs[1], so those are pinned. Then the relays are fetched from a Directory Server, along with their own fingerprints. So those connections are also authenticated. [1] https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/blob/42cee727fa281fff4e27f98544e5bca36259fbaf/src/or/config.c#L844 https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/blob/42cee727fa281fff4e27f98...
  • Franciscouzo 9y ago
    The worst the attacker could do is prevent you from accessing the Tor network, but that can be mitigated by using Bridges.
• icebraining 9y ago
  The end node could still sniff your traffic presumably. The same is true on a VPN. Tor is no different, except it adds extra layers for anonymization.
  • jopsen 9y ago
    you trust the VPN... TOR exit nodes should be considered adversaries trying to spy on you. They probably are :)
    • icebraining 9y ago
      Ah, "trust the VPN". Sounds naive :) at least the Tor exit node can't directly match my traffic with my payment information.
  • ce4 9y ago
    It's been shown more than once that this does happen frequently. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mgbdwv/badonion-honeypot-malicious-tor-exit-nodes https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mgbdwv/badonion-h... https://www.wired.com/2007/11/swedish-researc/ https://www.wired.com/2007/11/swedish-researc/
    • icebraining 9y ago
      Yes - my point is that the VPN is itself an exit node too.