No, the reason we don't see voting reform is because there's widespread ignorance of the significance of voting methods. I've spoken to Scott Wiener, Cory Booke

No, the reason we don't see voting reform is because there's widespread ignorance of the significance of voting methods. I've spoken to Scott Wiener, Cory Booker, and all manner of activist and politician about this issue, and people generally have a very hard time imagining how this could make a big difference. I point out that we've done exit polls where Approval Voting literally reverses the outcome (i.e. Maine 2014 gubernatorial), and still, they just can't seem to accept it. At one time, two dozen US cities used STV, and at another time nearly two dozen used Bucklin. And all of them but Cambridge (STV) reverted to Plurality. So it's just tough, because people are tough. There's some truth to the statement about IRV. If people are strategic, it essentially degrades to Plurality Voting. http://scorevoting.net/TarrIrv.html http://scorevoting.net/TarrIrv.html That's not to say that 100% of voters actually are strategic with IRV, but strategic voting appears to have caused IRV to maintain duopoly in countries like Australia—which is pretty undesirable IMO. http://scorevoting.net/AustralianPol.html http://scorevoting.net/AustralianPol.html Interestingly, polls show that a majority of Australians want to replace STV/IRV with Plurality. http://scorevoting.net/WhatVotersWant http://scorevoting.net/WhatVotersWant As for these specific criteria, let's be clear from the start that criteria are a very dumb way to assess voting methods, kind of like comparing race cars by comparing horsepower and drag instead of just putting them through timed trials. http://scorevoting.net/PropDiatribe.html http://scorevoting.net/PropDiatribe.html The answer there is Bayesian Regret, which shows Approval Voting performing exceptionally well, and IRV doing worst of the five commonly discussed alternatives. http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html Non-monotonicity is an actual problem—it results in a mathematical proof that the voting system has elected the wrong candidate in at least one of two "mirror image" scenarios. Failing the majority criterion is NOT a problem, in a technical mathematical sense. One of the most elementary facts of social choice theory is that it's possible for a group to prefer X over Y even though a majority of its members prefer Y to X. Mathematical proof here: http://scorevoting.net/XYvote.html http://scorevoting.net/XYvote.html http://scorevoting.net/CondorcetCycles http://scorevoting.net/CondorcetCycles Though for practical purposes this is all irrelevant, as it would be astronomically unlikely for a majority-preferred candidate to lose with Approval Voting. There is even a theorem that Approval Voting will elect Condorcet winners under rational voter strategy. http://scorevoting.net/AppCW http://scorevoting.net/AppCW With a good voting system, we'd expect/hope to see a competitive race with many candidates, so even having a majority favorite would be the real problem. Without that, the concept of a "majority winner" is nonsensical, yet you still see IRV proponents touting their system's ability to "guarantee a majority winner". I profile the absurdity of this claim here. https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/utilitarian-majoritarian https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/utilitarian-ma...