3 ms·
The TLS 1.3 drafts (and given they're in Last Call, presumably the RFC itself once published) use different types of brackets to indicate whether and how things
by tialaramex 9y ago
The TLS 1.3 drafts (and given they're in Last Call, presumably the RFC itself once published) use different types of brackets to indicate whether and how things are encrypted in the ASCII art diagrams. The curly braces {} are used for the Certificate structure, meaning it is encrypted using the session keys but it is NOT authenticated application data yet. We'll see why in a moment.
So, firstly I'm going to say, go read the drafts for yourself https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23 because I am pretty sure that's the most snarky response and also hey, it's right there, if I'm wrong that's a great place to start in proving so.
But then I'll answer your substantive question, because the answer is pretty interesting (and quite unlike earlier versions of TLS).
So, you are correct that we can (and TLS does) do DH without knowing who we're talking to, and that our problem is that although our session is encrypted and can't be eavesdropped, this seems useless because we don't know who the heck we're talking to, surely we can be subject to a Man in the Middle attack.
However, TLS 1.3 has a trick here, after sending Certificate the server sends CertificateVerify. CertificateVerify signs the entire key agreement (which we just did) with the identity from the Certificate. So, a client receiving CertificateVerify either gets a matching signature (the party we did our DH key agreement with _was_ the owner of the Certificate - good) or they don't (we're being MitM'd the phone call is coming from inside the house - get out!)
Once the client has checked CertificateVerify (and presuming they're happy with whatever was inside Certificate) they're truly secure and Application Data can begin to be processed.