2 ms·
>> browsers are trying to keep the problem manageable by making it difficult for JS to extract information from the timing channel (by limiting timer resolution
by phkahler 9y ago
>> browsers are trying to keep the problem manageable by making it difficult for JS to extract information from the timing channel (by limiting timer resolution and disabling features like SharedArrayBuffer that can be used to implement high-resolution timers), but this unfortunately limits the power of Web applications compared to native applications.
I don't see a problem with that. "Web applications" are inherently untrusted code. If it were not for untrusted code these attacks would not be an issue, so it doesn't seem unfair for a mitigation to negatively affect them.
- tomp 9y agoI consider any computer platform that cannot run an "untrusted" application in a manner that doesn't endanger its user (within certain limits - e.g. it's practically impossible to limit what kind of internet traffic the application can do, or what kind of scams it can make the user click through), a failed computer platform. In particular, browsers could always run JS in a separate process that's appropriately virtualized (i.e. has limited access to host information and resources).
- taeric 9y agoThis leaves a big hole. Many malicious packages will solicit trust from the user. That is, we seem to be plagued by misplaced trust moreso than untrusted applications. The analogy to civil engineering is we trust building makers. Few of us enter buildings we don't trust to stay up around us.
- koheripbal 9y agoWhat happens when these issues are addressed at the hardware level. Are users on new chips going to continue to live with performance nerfs to protect those who haven't upgraded, or will patches and fixes detect some CPU feature that IDs it as a "fixed" CPU... of course spoofing that will have its own security implications.