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"The suspect - identified by a hair found at the scene of the crime - refused to provide police with the PIN code to his phone so investigating officers turned

by tpush 9y ago

"The suspect - identified by a hair found at the scene of the crime - refused to provide police with the PIN code to his phone so investigating officers turned to an unnamed cyber-forensics firm in Munich, which broke into the device." Really interested in knowing how they got in (and what model of iPhone it was.)

lern_too_spel 9y ago
Especially since Apple claimed this was impossible in 2014. https://www.google.com/amp/appleinsider.com/articles/14/09/17/apple-says-incapable-of-decrypting-user-data-with-ios-8-even-for-government-agencies/amp/ https://www.google.com/amp/appleinsider.com/articles/14/09/1...
- grzm 9y ago
  The forensics team may have been able to brute force the PIN, depending on the settings, if I'm reading this correctly: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/there-are-ways-the-fbi-can-crack-the-iphone-pin-without-apple-doing-it-for-them/ https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/there-are-ways-the-f... (Please use direct links rather than amp links.)
  - lern_too_spel 9y ago
    Which again contradicts Apple's statement from 2014. My link is also a direct link to a faster loading page. I tried to load the appleinsider.com page, and it hung for nearly ten seconds waiting for a response from the server before I gave up. It's not worth my time, and it's not worth the reader of my comment's time.
    - deleted 9y ago
      [deleted]
    - ubernostrum 9y ago
      The main problem with a lot of these stories is that there are combinations of iPhone models, operating systems, and settings which are believed not to be breakable by general law enforcement agencies, and others which are known or strongly suspected to be. Apple tends to make its claims regarding latest iPhone model combined with latest iOS version combined with particular settings. Thus, for example, in the San Bernardino case, the fact that the phone in question was a 5C mattered. The 5C is not just an older phone, it has different security-oriented hardware inside, and that does change the security characteristics of the device. Also, the Apple statement you keep pointing to said that Apple, as of iOS 8, is unable to retrieve or reconstruct the key used to encrypt the phone's storage. Which is true -- Apple cannot do that, and has designed things so that Apple cannot do that. What the FBI wanted in that case was not for Apple to supply a key or a passcode (which they don't have). What the FBI wanted was for Apple to create and sign and load a custom firmware which would disable anti-brute-force protection for the passcode, allowing the FBI to determine the passcode via brute force. Apple could do that, but refused to do so. And for completeness' sake, that avenue is no longer available on more recent phones with more recent versions of iOS; performing an iOS update now requires the passcode, regardless of whether the update is initiated from the phone or from a connected device (even one previously designated as trusted).
      - lern_too_spel 9y ago
        > Also, the Apple statement you keep pointing to said that Apple, as of iOS 8, is unable to retrieve or reconstruct the key used to encrypt the phone's storage. False. Quoting from the article: "Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data." As I keep stating, Apple's statement is clearly false. Why did you decide to lie for Apple, too? They covered up their lie by removing it from their website, but we still have records of their statement in these articles, and your claiming otherwise does not change that.
        comex 9y ago
        There's a difference between a backdoor and a vulnerability - as exploited by a third party, say, Cellebrite. Nobody claims that any OS is free of vulnerabilities.
- Angostura 9y ago
  Not if your PIN is 1234
- ReverseCold 9y ago
  Has there been a case of someone breaking into a modern Samsung phone? Knox "officially" passes some level of security standard, not sure how it holds up. https://support.samsungknox.com/hc/en-us/articles/115013733108-Is-Knox-certified-by-the-US-government- https://support.samsungknox.com/hc/en-us/articles/1150137331...
- duxup 9y ago
  It makes sense that any security claim about something "impossible" from 4 years ago might now be possible. They may have been right in 2014.
milkthefat 9y ago
I thought I read an article linked from HN(which I can no longer find here or google) that vaguely stated they used a previously trusted device(PC) to gain access. That would mean the "yes, I trust this computer" notification has long term ramifications security-wise.
- matt-attack 9y ago
  Or couldn't it have actually been just a backup on that computer that they were able to open up?
jaclaz 9y ago
>Really interested in knowing how they got in (and what model of iPhone it was.) Likely (but not necessarily) it was Cellebrite CAIS: https://www.cyberscoop.com/cellebrite-iphone-6-ufed-samsung-galaxy-facebook-messenger-snapchat/ https://www.cyberscoop.com/cellebrite-iphone-6-ufed-samsung-... The iPhone model in question was (allegedly) a 6s, a German article: https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article172287105/Mordprozess-Hussein-K-Die-Version-vom-Handeln-im-Affekt-ist-mit-dem-heutigen-Tag-obsolet.html https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article172287105/Mordprozess...

by tpush 9y ago

lern_too_spel 9y ago

Especially since Apple claimed this was impossible in 2014. https://www.google.com/amp/appleinsider.com/articles/14/09/17/apple-says-incapable-of-decrypting-user-data-with-ios-8-even-for-government-agencies/amp/ https://www.google.com/amp/appleinsider.com/articles/14/09/1...

grzm 9y ago
The forensics team may have been able to brute force the PIN, depending on the settings, if I'm reading this correctly: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/there-are-ways-the-fbi-can-crack-the-iphone-pin-without-apple-doing-it-for-them/ https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/there-are-ways-the-f... (Please use direct links rather than amp links.)
- lern_too_spel 9y ago
  Which again contradicts Apple's statement from 2014. My link is also a direct link to a faster loading page. I tried to load the appleinsider.com page, and it hung for nearly ten seconds waiting for a response from the server before I gave up. It's not worth my time, and it's not worth the reader of my comment's time.
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
  - ubernostrum 9y ago
    The main problem with a lot of these stories is that there are combinations of iPhone models, operating systems, and settings which are believed not to be breakable by general law enforcement agencies, and others which are known or strongly suspected to be. Apple tends to make its claims regarding latest iPhone model combined with latest iOS version combined with particular settings. Thus, for example, in the San Bernardino case, the fact that the phone in question was a 5C mattered. The 5C is not just an older phone, it has different security-oriented hardware inside, and that does change the security characteristics of the device. Also, the Apple statement you keep pointing to said that Apple, as of iOS 8, is unable to retrieve or reconstruct the key used to encrypt the phone's storage. Which is true -- Apple cannot do that, and has designed things so that Apple cannot do that. What the FBI wanted in that case was not for Apple to supply a key or a passcode (which they don't have). What the FBI wanted was for Apple to create and sign and load a custom firmware which would disable anti-brute-force protection for the passcode, allowing the FBI to determine the passcode via brute force. Apple could do that, but refused to do so. And for completeness' sake, that avenue is no longer available on more recent phones with more recent versions of iOS; performing an iOS update now requires the passcode, regardless of whether the update is initiated from the phone or from a connected device (even one previously designated as trusted).
    - lern_too_spel 9y ago
      > Also, the Apple statement you keep pointing to said that Apple, as of iOS 8, is unable to retrieve or reconstruct the key used to encrypt the phone's storage. False. Quoting from the article: "Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data." As I keep stating, Apple's statement is clearly false. Why did you decide to lie for Apple, too? They covered up their lie by removing it from their website, but we still have records of their statement in these articles, and your claiming otherwise does not change that.
      - comex 9y ago
        There's a difference between a backdoor and a vulnerability - as exploited by a third party, say, Cellebrite. Nobody claims that any OS is free of vulnerabilities.
Angostura 9y ago
Not if your PIN is 1234
ReverseCold 9y ago
Has there been a case of someone breaking into a modern Samsung phone? Knox "officially" passes some level of security standard, not sure how it holds up. https://support.samsungknox.com/hc/en-us/articles/115013733108-Is-Knox-certified-by-the-US-government- https://support.samsungknox.com/hc/en-us/articles/1150137331...
duxup 9y ago
It makes sense that any security claim about something "impossible" from 4 years ago might now be possible. They may have been right in 2014.

milkthefat 9y ago

I thought I read an article linked from HN(which I can no longer find here or google) that vaguely stated they used a previously trusted device(PC) to gain access. That would mean the "yes, I trust this computer" notification has long term ramifications security-wise.

matt-attack 9y ago
Or couldn't it have actually been just a backup on that computer that they were able to open up?

jaclaz 9y ago

>Really interested in knowing how they got in (and what model of iPhone it was.) Likely (but not necessarily) it was Cellebrite CAIS: https://www.cyberscoop.com/cellebrite-iphone-6-ufed-samsung-galaxy-facebook-messenger-snapchat/ https://www.cyberscoop.com/cellebrite-iphone-6-ufed-samsung-... The iPhone model in question was (allegedly) a 6s, a German article: https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article172287105/Mordprozess-Hussein-K-Die-Version-vom-Handeln-im-Affekt-ist-mit-dem-heutigen-Tag-obsolet.html https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article172287105/Mordprozess...