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The function of the registrars is as a mechanism for homesteading, much like establishing initial private ownership of some newly discovered land. As such, the
by ataggart 16y ago
The function of the registrars is as a mechanism for homesteading, much like establishing initial private ownership of some newly discovered land. As such, the price charged by the registrars should be largely irrelevant and held as low as possible to not inadvertently set a price floor (this is after all a commodity with effectively zero marginal supply cost).
Once some individual comes up with and homesteads a domain, it can be used by them toward some ends, or traded/auctioned in the market whereby a price will emerge (see Coase theorem). To be clear, there is no "right" price, just whatever the market will bear, even if the market is constrained to a single domain name. Externally applied "fixes" would only serve to distort the market in unexpected and harmful ways. As Hayek noted, "The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design."
If there is a problem here it is either that the transaction costs (including non-monetary costs) of such exchanges are high (which provides an entrepreneurial opportunity), or the value of the domain to its current owner just happens to be higher than what others want to pay and those others are upset. Not much can be done about the latter, short of coercion.
- eru 16y agoInstead of selling domains, they could lease them, and auction off the new lease once the old lease has expired. Most auctions would probably not be contested, and you had the same situation as before. But for the interesting domains, ICANN could thus capture the value of the domain. Neither this or the current solution (what you describe) is preferable from the outside. It's just that different parties capture the values of the domains. (And if I were to make the rules, you can bet that I would ensure that I capture the value. Or at least some of it.)