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"no first use" is begging the enemy to attack first.

by jlebrech 9y ago

boomboomsubban 9y ago
How? What benefit does the enemy gain that they don't already have by launching first?
- jerf 9y ago
  In a super-power-sized exchange, increased confidence that their missiles will land before the other side retaliates. Launch sites can be destroyed, which means you may face fewer weapons. Planners during the Cold War appeared to consider "20% of my population survives and 5% of theirs does" to be a victory, and promising you won't launch until you're hours and hours of sure of what's going on is inviting a pre-emption strike. That said, even if someone promises up and down they won't retaliate until they are very sure what's going on, that's not a guarantee that if you launch 1000 missiles at them that they won't launch immediately in return. I personally think the game theory shows it's better to signal willingness to retaliate swiftly, but even if that's too much for you to stomach the game theory clearly says you'd better have the capability of swift retaliation, regardless. For the smaller players like North Korea or Iran, who are credibly threatening to use nuclear weapons in the next decade, but have no credible possibility of doing it at superpower scales, nothing much. They face annihilation if they launch, regardless. However, some of these smaller regimes are signaling that they are willing to face annihilation to get their strikes in. How much of this is game-theory-based posturing, and how much of it is true, well, that's for the reader to decide. (Though I will toss in that at least North Korea is also signaling a belief that they will be annihilated if they don't get nukes, so given their belief system they may still not care, especially since it may be the case that North Korea === Kim Jong Un, and frankly, he may be rational to believe he's riding a tiger by the tail and must either get to and use nukes or personally face one sort of death or another. I see Iran as making more conventional power plays throughout the region, and even if their recent protests didn't topple the regime, it is likely that one way or another they are going to be forced to pour less resources into the nuke programs, either because they will need to placate the population, or because protest N+1 will topple the regime, or because they finally provoke external military or covert action that will result in regime change.)
  - boomboomsubban 9y ago
    "No first use" is about the US pledging that it will not he the aggressor in another nuclear contest. Retaliatory capability wouldn't really change.
    - lostcolony 9y ago
      Yes it would. "No first use" means you have to be DAMN sure you're retaliating, rather than responding to a glitch. That requires time to confirm that, indeed, missiles are incoming, rather than just "some instruments in a secure bunker somewhere say some missiles are incoming".
      - boomboomsubban 9y ago
        If they mistakenly retaliate, I doubt "breaking their pledge" will be one of the major concerns of the world.

"no first use" is begging the enemy to attack first.

boomboomsubban 9y ago

How? What benefit does the enemy gain that they don't already have by launching first?

jerf 9y ago
In a super-power-sized exchange, increased confidence that their missiles will land before the other side retaliates. Launch sites can be destroyed, which means you may face fewer weapons. Planners during the Cold War appeared to consider "20% of my population survives and 5% of theirs does" to be a victory, and promising you won't launch until you're hours and hours of sure of what's going on is inviting a pre-emption strike. That said, even if someone promises up and down they won't retaliate until they are very sure what's going on, that's not a guarantee that if you launch 1000 missiles at them that they won't launch immediately in return. I personally think the game theory shows it's better to signal willingness to retaliate swiftly, but even if that's too much for you to stomach the game theory clearly says you'd better have the capability of swift retaliation, regardless. For the smaller players like North Korea or Iran, who are credibly threatening to use nuclear weapons in the next decade, but have no credible possibility of doing it at superpower scales, nothing much. They face annihilation if they launch, regardless. However, some of these smaller regimes are signaling that they are willing to face annihilation to get their strikes in. How much of this is game-theory-based posturing, and how much of it is true, well, that's for the reader to decide. (Though I will toss in that at least North Korea is also signaling a belief that they will be annihilated if they don't get nukes, so given their belief system they may still not care, especially since it may be the case that North Korea === Kim Jong Un, and frankly, he may be rational to believe he's riding a tiger by the tail and must either get to and use nukes or personally face one sort of death or another. I see Iran as making more conventional power plays throughout the region, and even if their recent protests didn't topple the regime, it is likely that one way or another they are going to be forced to pour less resources into the nuke programs, either because they will need to placate the population, or because protest N+1 will topple the regime, or because they finally provoke external military or covert action that will result in regime change.)
- boomboomsubban 9y ago
  "No first use" is about the US pledging that it will not he the aggressor in another nuclear contest. Retaliatory capability wouldn't really change.
  - lostcolony 9y ago
    Yes it would. "No first use" means you have to be DAMN sure you're retaliating, rather than responding to a glitch. That requires time to confirm that, indeed, missiles are incoming, rather than just "some instruments in a secure bunker somewhere say some missiles are incoming".
    - boomboomsubban 9y ago
      If they mistakenly retaliate, I doubt "breaking their pledge" will be one of the major concerns of the world.