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Seems like that could be defended with Casper's approach: use security deposits, slash them for burn reuse, and reward anyone who provides proof of reuse.
by DennisP 9y ago
Seems like that could be defended with Casper's approach: use security deposits, slash them for burn reuse, and reward anyone who provides proof of reuse.
- contravariant 9y agoWell yeah, you can use any proof of work, proof of stake system to prevent it. However if you've got one of those, what would you need the proof of burn for?
- DennisP 9y agoProof of stake is more than just that. Arguably it does make proof of burn obsolete, but it might still be worth exploring burn+slash mechanisms.
- runeks 9y agoThe problem is that the miners -- whose fraud is proven with a transaction -- have the responsibility of including this transaction in the chain they control. Which means the only solution is to fork: now we have two or more chains (any number of valid chains which includes this proof can exist) -- how do we reach consensus on which to follow? Before the fraud, the miners were allegedly responsible for reaching consensus. And when they commit fraud, it's assumed that the network can reach consensus without the miners (on a single, valid chain which includes the proof of miner fraud). If everyone except the miners were able to reach consensus on a single chain in the first place, why did we need the miners?
- DennisP 9y agoAren't you assuming the miners are all working together in a coalition? You're pretty much screwed anyway if that's the case.