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> I'm not sure which things we've rebuilt with retpoline enabled. As Paul mentions in the article, the point is for software you believe needs to be protected,

> I'm not sure which things we've rebuilt with retpoline enabled. As Paul mentions in the article, the point is for software you believe needs to be protected, which may not be everything we build. With all due respect, i'm not sure about the answer you are giving me. I dont see why we are using the word "belief". If there is some secret sauce that Google is unwilling to talk about, then it would be good to have that declared. Because it is extremely weird that you would claim to have a compiler tech that fixes this issue (which needed kernel level fixes otherwise) and not be able to categorically declare what was compiled by Retpoline that gives this benefit. Possibly its the hypervisor you are using... which explains the zero downtime migration. P.S. I'm a Google Cloud customer as well.

boulos 9y ago
I meant that only in the “I’m not sure all code at Google has been rebuilt and had retpoline enabled” sense. We said in the article: > By December, all Google Cloud Platform (GCP) services had protections in place for all known variants of the vulnerability. which means all the bits of the stacks across all our GCP products (i.e., not just our host kernels and GCE’s hypervisor but also say App Engine sandboxes). KPTI for kernels plus recompiling any sensitive thing (kernel, hypervisor, etc.) with a retpoline capable compiler. We’re not holding back secrets. Just trying to get the patches out while keeping blog posts relatively parseable by the general public. Note that no matter how disruptive kernel or other changes are, live migration always makes them “zero downtime migration”. The key here is that using retpoline to protect systems software against Variant 2 results in much lower overhead than other proposed mitigation strategies, particularly on older hardware but even a bit on Skylake.

boulos 9y ago

I meant that only in the “I’m not sure all code at Google has been rebuilt and had retpoline enabled” sense. We said in the article: > By December, all Google Cloud Platform (GCP) services had protections in place for all known variants of the vulnerability. which means all the bits of the stacks across all our GCP products (i.e., not just our host kernels and GCE’s hypervisor but also say App Engine sandboxes). KPTI for kernels plus recompiling any sensitive thing (kernel, hypervisor, etc.) with a retpoline capable compiler. We’re not holding back secrets. Just trying to get the patches out while keeping blog posts relatively parseable by the general public. Note that no matter how disruptive kernel or other changes are, live migration always makes them “zero downtime migration”. The key here is that using retpoline to protect systems software against Variant 2 results in much lower overhead than other proposed mitigation strategies, particularly on older hardware but even a bit on Skylake.