> Consciousness will likely one day be considered a some physical process The only people I know of that might contest that non-human animals are conscious are

> Consciousness will likely one day be considered a some physical process The only people I know of that might contest that non-human animals are conscious are dualists who attribute consciousness to minds and minds only to human beings. > it's a mistake to just take some people's word that physicalism can't account for our qualitative perceptions Physicalism BY DEFINITION cannot account for qualia because the presuppositions of physicalism BY DEFINITION rule out the possibility of accounting for qualia. This is not the same as saying that consciousness or the experience of color is non-physical. It is the same as saying that the metaphysics of physicalism is too inadequate. Sadly, physicalism has become a blindly held dogma by philosophers like Dennett and Rosenberg, leading them to embrace eliminativism (the denial that qualia exist at all). Naturally, this is an evasion, a Procrustean cherrypicking of the evidence to suit the scientistic, physicalist dogma. It is an incoherent position and a non-starter. The solution is to embrace a richer metaphysics instead of repeating the vacuous claim that we will/may one say have a solution to the problem of qualia while clinging to presuppositions that are false. It can't and won't happen.