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> "Consciousness", in the philosophical meaning, is even more interesting because it is entirely non-empirical; it can't be measured in any objective sense. Do
by naasking 9y ago
> "Consciousness", in the philosophical meaning, is even more interesting because it is entirely non-empirical; it can't be measured in any objective sense.
Don't mistake "don't know how" with "cannot". The fact that we currently don't know what consciousness is, doesn't entail that we won't one day. Consciousness will likely one day be considered a some physical process, which means it will one day be measurable.
The difficulties surrounding qualia require a resolution, but it's a mistake to just take some people's word that physicalism can't account for our qualitative perceptions.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 9y agoNo. You are incorrect. Let us say that we have a computer system so complicated that it is capable of mimicking a human being with perfect accuracy. You would probably say that that computer is not a being that has consciousness, because it is merely doing calculations to replicate behavior. Problem is, you could easily say the same about any given human being. There is, quite literally, no way to tell the difference through objective measurement. We can measure responses to stimuli, we can determine the complexity of a system, but we have no way of determining if a system experiences anything or is simply running a program, and we never will.
- mannykannot 9y ago> Let us say that we have a computer system so complicated that it is capable of mimicking a human being with perfect accuracy. You would probably say that that computer is not a being that has consciousness, because it is merely doing calculations to replicate behavior. Actually, I would seriously consider the proposition that it is intelligent, especially if it wasn't mimicking one specific person, and would be inclined to take Occam's razor to the proposition that it is actually faking it in ways that cannot be explained.
- naasking 9y ago> Let us say that we have a computer system so complicated that it is capable of mimicking a human being with perfect accuracy. You would probably say that that computer is not a being that has consciousness, because it is merely doing calculations to replicate behavior. I have no problem considering such a system conscious and intelligent. What's the difficulty exactly? > Problem is, you could easily say the same about any given human being. There is, quite literally, no way to tell the difference through objective measurement. Exactly, which means there is no difference. Consciousness will turn out to be a functional process, which means any system with the same structure will exhibit consciousness. This would be an objective measurement.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 9y agoThen how can you make a statement to the effect that we may one day know how to measure consciousness, which you have just agreed is fundamentally unmeasurable?
- snowwrestler 9y agoIt's just a question of definition. Instead of "consciousness" being unmeasurable, the word would get redefined to something that can be measured, like a particular volume and/or type of calculation. If that happens it will be in good company; at one point people thought that temperature and heat, for example, were fundamentally subjective and not measurable.
- naasking 9y ago> which you have just agreed is fundamentally unmeasurable? Where did I do that?
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 9y agoLooks like you added a line to clarify, or I missed it on first reading: > Consciousness will turn out to be a functional process Here's where I disagree. In order to know what kind of physical structure produces consciousness, you need to know what consciousness is, and we have no way of doing that. You can define some arbitrary criteria, say, having the ability to make metatools, but that is meaningless in this context, "conscious" will just be another word for "can make metatools". In an effort to clarify, let me ask you this: why do you care what is and is not conscious?
- naasking 9y ago> In order to know what kind of physical structure produces consciousness, you need to know what consciousness is, and we have no way of doing that. I don't see how this is different than any other empirical fact we didn't know before we started exploring the world. In what way could we properly characterize fire, or stars, or bacteria before we had any conception of such things? Yet, I don't think anyone sensible would disagree that we largely understand these concepts now. Similarly, consciousness is an amalgamation of different information processes that we have yet to disentangle, and all we have is a catch-all term "consciousness" to describe our ignorance. > In an effort to clarify, let me ask you this: why do you care what is and is not conscious? I care about anything that is not yet explained.
- bobthechef 9y ago> Consciousness will likely one day be considered a some physical process The only people I know of that might contest that non-human animals are conscious are dualists who attribute consciousness to minds and minds only to human beings. > it's a mistake to just take some people's word that physicalism can't account for our qualitative perceptions Physicalism BY DEFINITION cannot account for qualia because the presuppositions of physicalism BY DEFINITION rule out the possibility of accounting for qualia. This is not the same as saying that consciousness or the experience of color is non-physical. It is the same as saying that the metaphysics of physicalism is too inadequate. Sadly, physicalism has become a blindly held dogma by philosophers like Dennett and Rosenberg, leading them to embrace eliminativism (the denial that qualia exist at all). Naturally, this is an evasion, a Procrustean cherrypicking of the evidence to suit the scientistic, physicalist dogma. It is an incoherent position and a non-starter. The solution is to embrace a richer metaphysics instead of repeating the vacuous claim that we will/may one say have a solution to the problem of qualia while clinging to presuppositions that are false. It can't and won't happen.
- naasking 9y ago> Physicalism BY DEFINITION cannot account for qualia because the presuppositions of physicalism BY DEFINITION rule out the possibility of accounting for qualia. Except we clearly invented a term describing something we've observed or believe, therefore something must be accounted for. Ergo, physicalism still must account for qualia, even if it's not the account you were hoping for. > Sadly, physicalism has become a blindly held dogma by philosophers like Dennett and Rosenberg, leading them to embrace eliminativism (the denial that qualia exist at all). Please, every time we thought humans were special, we were wrong. Arguments arguing for our specialness effectively amount to special pleading. > The solution is to embrace a richer metaphysics instead of repeating the vacuous claim that we will/may one say have a solution to the problem of qualia while clinging to presuppositions that are false. It can't and won't happen. So said the vitalists. Met any vitalists lately?