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A malicious server admin would probably be able to just intercept and stop that. I don't know how they do group encryption, but I imagine they either have a roo
by StavrosK 9y ago
A malicious server admin would probably be able to just intercept and stop that. I don't know how they do group encryption, but I imagine they either have a room key (although with forward secrecy that sounds unlikely) or they do 1:M sending. In any case, it sounds that, since the server doesn't have the group chat keys, they could just check for authorization from the admin (ie a signed message verifying that they're the ones adding the user) before adding a new user to the chat.
- baby 9y ago> A malicious server admin would probably be able to just intercept and stop that Which would stop anyone from being invited to the group > or they do 1:M sending That's what they do. When you join a group you generate a key that you distribute to all the other participants via a 1-on-1 encrypted session, you then use it to derive keys in a normal chaining-key thingy to encrypt messages to all other participants. > they could just check for authorization from the admin So you mean the admin would be in on it?
- StavrosK 9y ago> Which would stop anyone from being invited to the group No, just the malicious server adding the malicious user. > So you mean the admin would be in on it? I mean WhatsApp could patch this attack vector by requiring the new member to get a signed assertion from the group admin, proving to the other members that the group admin was the person who added the user.
- baby 9y ago> I mean WhatsApp could patch this attack vector by requiring the new member to get a signed assertion from the group admin, proving to the other members that the group admin was the person who added the user. this is related to what I was talking about, except that in my scenario the admin distributes the proof
- StavrosK 9y agoAh okay, I think we're talking about the same thing then.