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In specific answer to your second question, Let's Encrypt intends to blacklist IPs for those providers from using tls-sni-01 proof of control. Now, requiring u
by tialaramex 9y ago
In specific answer to your second question, Let's Encrypt intends to blacklist IPs for those providers from using tls-sni-01 proof of control.
Now, requiring unrelated third-parties to take action is (perhaps unfortunately) nothing new for DV. Back in the day lots of the web mail providers got bitten because some CA would decide that, say, receipt of email to ssl-certificate-officer@example.com is proof of control of example.com, so you just sign up for web mail and say you want the email address ssl-certificate-officer and bingo you get a certificate for a few bucks. This was exploited over and over.
Even today, the Ten Blessed Methods let a CA choose any email address you listed in WHOIS (fair enough, don't list anybody else's address in WHOIS) _or_ any of 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster'.
So when you build a web mail system you need to explicitly blacklist those five email addresses even if you would never need an account named "webmaster" or "admin", if you fail to take this specific action anybody can get certificates for your domain by talking to any of the commercial CAs that use a method complying with 3.2.2.4.4.
Let's Encrypt already disabled a feature of http-01 validation before going live to avoid needing bulk web hosts and CDNs to make a sensible configuration choice, because surveys suggested that lots of them had left insecure default choices enabled.
Or another email example (again thus not affecting Let's Encrypt): Lots of companies purchased anti-phishing systems that scan all incoming email to check for dodgy links. These systems typically dereference all the links, check what they find and quarantine suspicious emails. Several CAs had systems which sent an email saying "Just click here to authorize issuance". The anti-phishing system follows the link, now it's clicked, anyone could get a certificate for these domains because the anti-phishing system would "authorize" anything they requested...
Now, all these are historical rather than current examples, but they do illustrate that "requiring unrelated parties to take specific actions" won't be new or unique to Let's Encrypt.
- teddyh 9y ago> So when you build a web mail system you need to explicitly blacklist those five email addresses… Actually, you should blacklist all of the addresses listed in RFC 2142¹. Also consider this blog post for additional addresses to block: https://ldpreload.com/blog/names-to-reserve https://ldpreload.com/blog/names-to-reserve 1. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2142 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2142
- ademarre 9y ago> "Let's Encrypt already disabled a feature of http-01 validation before going live" I'm curious what this was. Can you elaborate or point me somewhere I can read about that?
- tialaramex 9y agoSure, http-01 as defined originally has a flag for whether to do the validation with plaintext HTTP on port 80 (as today) or using HTTPS on port 443. Now, suppose http://no-ssl.customer1.example/ http://no-ssl.customer1.example/ is a site Customer 1 is running on a bulk host, and it doesn't have SSL. We (the attacker) ask Let's Encrypt for an HTTPS version of the http-01 validation for this name no-ssl.customer1.example A DNS lookup of no-ssl.customer1.example gives Let's Encrypt the IP address of the bulk hosting server. They connect to port 443 of that address, and they do SNI and say they expect to talk to no-ssl.customer1.example, then they do an HTTP request with Host: no-ssl.customer1.example and a GET for the relevant .well-known/acme-challenge/ file - what happens? A common default configuration of web servers used by bulk hosters says if anything doesn't match, let's use a "default" such as the first (often alphabetically first) named virtual host to serve the answers. No error, just assume that must be what the request was really for. Since there is no SSL version of no-ssl.customer1.example, the server drops through to this default, and the web server offers the certificate and content for aaaaa.attacker.example which we, the attacker have prepared. This includes the ACME answer file, Let's Encrypt is satisfied we have "control" over no-ssl.customer1.example and grants us a certificate we clearly shouldn't have. Apache and nginx both do this by default. Lots of bulk hosts are set up to use them without a configuration that prevents this happening, and they didn't seem to be in any hurry to fix it. So, Let's Encrypt disabled this feature for their production release.
- ademarre 9y agoThanks for expanding. That's interesting. So they disabled http-01 over TLS [0]. Two questions: 1. Isn't the default virtual host practice still a problem even without TLS/SNI? Apache chooses a default virtual host on port 80 in the same way. Is that "acceptable" simply because it's more common for the default port 80 virtual host to be controlled by the hosting provider? That's not as robust as one would hope. 2. Wouldn't http-01 over TLS be made safe if the certificate was required to be valid for the domain being challenged? Granted, there's a TLS chicken and egg problem there, but that's beside the point. [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-09#section-8.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-09#section-...