> When I said the names above I've got in mind something exactly opposite I wasn't making a judgment about the terms "creeps, weirdos, nerds and morons", I was

> When I said the names above I've got in mind something exactly opposite I wasn't making a judgment about the terms "creeps, weirdos, nerds and morons", I was merely reaching for a shorthand to refer to the groups you were discussing. I could have substituted in "people with mild autism" and have made the same point. > but the transit driver himself might be a happy person. He can follow his "special interests", he is focused, he's doing what he likes whole day Let's consider this. The original poster points at something interesting: > There is a huge amount of work to do in this area still. Most of these kids with incredible abilities are not receiving the help and support they need in order to ever be in a position where they can join society and use them for good. The OP believes that there exists an idea of goodness extending beyond oneself, relating to joining society and acting. Perhaps what we, as members of society, want is not a happy life, but a meaningful life[1]. Happiness is relatively easy in comparison, we have drugs that can provide it on demand (opiates, for example). Religious practices were aware of this divide between happiness and meaningfulness, with the most obvious example being Protestantism, whose practices directly support the idea that but hard work = a good life. But, it's ultimately up to you to decide to what ends you want to live your life. Perhaps the fact that you have the ability to make this decision, while a low-functioning person does not, is what makes the original claim (about high-functioning individuals having a worse fate than low-functioning individuals) absurd. 1: http://s3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/1547772/cf4bc2ae6ff144e9cd581c8c30af2d67.pdf?1514839873 http://s3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/1547772/cf4bc2ae6f... EDIT: if you're up for some reading, I was informed of this essay[2] by philosopher Thomas Nagel which addresses some of these topics: > Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires as remain to him can be satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from care. Such a development would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only for his friends and relations, or for society, but also and primarily, for the person himself. This does not mean that a contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who has been reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune. He is the one we pity, though of course he does not mind his condition. It is in fact the same condition he was in at the age of three months, except that he is bigger. If we did not pity him then, why pity him now; in any case, who is there to pity? The intelligent adult has disappeared, and for a creature like the one before us, happiness consists in a full stomach and a dry diaper. > If these objections are invalid, it must be because they rest on a mistaken assumption about the temporal reelation between the subject of a misfortune and the circumstances which constitute it. If, instead of concentrating exclusively on the oversized baby before us, we consider the person he was, and the person he could be now, then his reduction to this state and the cancellation of his natural adult development constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe. 2: http://dbanach.com/death.htm http://dbanach.com/death.htm