4 ms·
what's the point of "more encryption than you have now" if it can be disabled by mitm (this includes the 'wireless networks' cited as a good reason to use it) a
by peterwwillis 16y ago
what's the point of "more encryption than you have now" if it can be disabled by mitm (this includes the 'wireless networks' cited as a good reason to use it) and you don't even know if it's working? if i want to use encryption, i want to know its encrypted. there is no point otherwise.
an example: i'm using an unencrypted network and plaintext protocol. if there's no attacker on the network, my data is "safe." if there is an attacker, my data is effectively compromised.
if i'm using this solution around the same network connection and there is no attacker on the network, my data is safe. if there is an attacker, they'll see it's this lame attempt at encryption, disable it through mitm, and my data is effectively compromised.
in a real life setting i can't depend on this to secure my data. however, ssh, openvpn, ipsec and other solutions provide assured encryption (unless you screw up the configuration). you don't even need a CA with ssh or openvpn - copy your keys or certs by a usb key once and you immediately have a strong defense against mitm.
i'd love to see sites provide a secure encryption alternative to SSL which allows for out-of-band transfer of secure keys and 1-to-1 authentication to prevent a nation's clandestine operations from peeking at my traffic. that probably won't happen though. in the meantime i protect my last-mile access with a secured tunnel; i just pray SSL is strong enough to not be attacked at a hop from my tunnel endpoint to the site.
- avar 16y agoThe point is to upgrade the connections that are unencrypted now to use encryption. A MitM can only insert his own data into your dialog, he can't passively eavesdrop on an existing encrypted connection.
- tptacek 16y agoThis is the waxed-mustache damsel-tied-up-on-the-railroad-tracks notion of Internet attackers, who, getting a sudden bee in their bonnet to torment 'avar from Hacker News, leap upon his connections only to find that, drat!, 'avar had enabled tcpcrypt and all his connections are safeguarded. The real Internet attackers owned up your ISP 2 years ago, and on the real Internet you originate hundreds of new connections across that owned-up Internet every minute. The security negotiation on any "old" connection is irrelevant. All that matters is the security of each new connection. If they're safe, the protocol works. If they're not, the protocol is broken.
- avar 16y agoNobody said anything about "old" connections in this thread. wmf mentioned how encrypting everything (even if you don't know who's at the other end) is "no worse than the status quo". Protocols that don't use encryption now aren't broken, and they could be slightly improved by transparently using encryption, because at least you'd deter passive sniffing.
- tptacek 16y agoIf you and a friend exchange certificates, TLS protects you from most governments, including US domestic law enforcement. If you and a friend set it up, tcpcrypt protects you from people who don't know to MITM TCP connections.
- avar 16y agoYes, and if we meet and exchange one-time pads we'll be even more secure. However neither that nor TLS "work out of the box: require no configuration, [and] no changes to applications".
- tptacek 16y agoNo, it's going to be about as hard for (say) the FBI to break TLS as it is for them to break an OTP; either way, it isn't happening. Can you say that for tcpcrypt? Of course not. I don't know what your second sentence even means. I didn't do anything to configure TLS. What did you have to do?
- avar 16y agoI'm citing the design aims of Tcpcrypt, from their website. Not everything uses HTTP, a bunch of things like Torrent, IRC etc. use unencrypted protocols by default, and you have to explicitly add support to each one for encryption. Either by adding SSL support to the programs themselves, or by setting up a tunnel. That's not the same as using opportunistic encryption that can happen at the kernel level. You could also do that with SSL to achieve the same aims, but the point is that it's opportunistic and happens without further userspace configuration.