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> That's false. There are mechanisms for lost keys revocation. This is already a solved problem. This is very dangerously wrong. Revoked keys decrypt old data
by tedunangst 9y ago
> That's false. There are mechanisms for lost keys revocation. This is already a solved problem.
This is very dangerously wrong. Revoked keys decrypt old data just fine. Revocation is advisory. Your attacker will choose to disregard that advice and decrypt anyway.
> And Email has a lot more benefits than your typical IM - it's a standard after all and can be used every everyone on Earth, you don't need to rely on any app adoption curve.
The fact that encrypted email interfaces with plaintext email has resulted in a continuous never ending series of screw ups where the secret data email gets splattered in plaintext across the network. A secure network protocol is only secure if it's incapable of being insecure.
- dredmorbius 9y agoThe keyholder can re-key / re-encrypt messages they hold against the new key(s). Obviously: they cannot re-key / re-encrypt messages they don't hold that were encrypted against the now-untrusted key. Do you see any ways around that? Doesn't key-based encryption of long-duration data intrinsically have this limitation?
- ekianjo 9y ago> A secure network protocol is only secure if it's incapable of being insecure. As long as an email leaves from your computer in encrypted form, what is the point of failure as long as you are careful with your private key?