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> Lose that key, ever, and not only is every message you send in the future unsafe, but every message you've ever sent in the past is too. That's a terrible pro
by ekianjo 9y ago
> Lose that key, ever, and not only is every message you send in the future unsafe, but every message you've ever sent in the past is too. That's a terrible property for a secure messaging system.
That's false. There are mechanisms for lost keys revocation. This is already a solved problem.
> Email leaks metadata. In fact, some of what we call email "metadata" isn't even metadata --- stuff like subject lines are simply content. They're sent in plaintext. We would never accept a new secure messaging system that behaved like that.
So do you have any other email-like system out there, not dependent on a centralized service, that does not leak meta-data?
> * Most email users get their email from a website. Unless you make them install something on all their computers --- and at that point, just get them to install Signal, WhatsApp, or Wire --- "encrypting" their email involves schemes in which those websites can get their plaintext mail.
Can you host your own WhatsApp server? You own Signal server? No. Having your own email account on a VPS is trivial and much lower effort to remain in control of your communications.
The point is that you dont use website to consult your email if you want to move to encryption. And Email has a lot more benefits than your typical IM - it's a standard after all and can be used every everyone on Earth, you don't need to rely on any app adoption curve.
- tptacek 9y agoRevocation doesn't provide forward security. Standards are what we say they are; almost everyone can use Signal today, and we'd be better of spending the effort to make sure literally everybody can than trying to retrofit security onto SMTP email.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- ekianjo 9y ago> almost everyone can use Signal today Except that almost everyone does not. Yet everyone has an email address. I'd say you have to pick your fight. Trying to convert everyone to Signal, even though it will never replace email in what email broadly does and allows, or trying to add encryption to email.
- tptacek 9y agoFirst, I think you'll be surprised to find how many people use Signal Protocol today, since it's been integrated into one of the world's most popular messaging applications. Second, you suggested that we try to retrofit security into email because "it's a standard". My argument, which you haven't rebutted, is that that doesn't matter.
- ekianjo 9y ago> Second, you suggested that we try to retrofit security into email because "it's a standard". My argument, which you haven't rebutted, is that that doesn't matter. It matters because you need to use email for about everything. Ever seen a bank asking you to register using your Signal account? Ever seen any government website relying on anything else than Email? It's pretty clear Email is the de facto standard and it matters because people have to use it anyway. So adding security to email is worthwhile no matter if it's not your only way to communicate.
- blfr 9y agoIt doesn't help us all that much that a lot of people are using the Signal Protocol since they're using it in several incompatible silos. Whereas virtually all people using email can communicate with each other. I use the vanilla Signal. I cannot talk to users of Whatsapp Signal. Also, there is value in email's address scheme. The person@organization.tld format is very convenient for identifying senders and recipients.
- tptacek 9y agoSo keep it, and use it only for rendezvous for better systems, and for the automated transactional bullets that email is principally used for today.
- anigbrowl 9y agoI love signal and kinda-sorta agree, but a) Right now Signal is oriented around your hpone # and while most people have phones, they come at a cost, are less easy to acquire than an email address, and much less anonymous b) Signal (and slack and so on) organize conversations around individuals and groups, rather than around subject. That's OK for personal contacts (with whom you have conversational context) but not so great for many other contexts where you'd like things structured by subject
- tedunangst 9y ago> That's false. There are mechanisms for lost keys revocation. This is already a solved problem. This is very dangerously wrong. Revoked keys decrypt old data just fine. Revocation is advisory. Your attacker will choose to disregard that advice and decrypt anyway. > And Email has a lot more benefits than your typical IM - it's a standard after all and can be used every everyone on Earth, you don't need to rely on any app adoption curve. The fact that encrypted email interfaces with plaintext email has resulted in a continuous never ending series of screw ups where the secret data email gets splattered in plaintext across the network. A secure network protocol is only secure if it's incapable of being insecure.
- dredmorbius 9y agoThe keyholder can re-key / re-encrypt messages they hold against the new key(s). Obviously: they cannot re-key / re-encrypt messages they don't hold that were encrypted against the now-untrusted key. Do you see any ways around that? Doesn't key-based encryption of long-duration data intrinsically have this limitation?
- ekianjo 9y ago> A secure network protocol is only secure if it's incapable of being insecure. As long as an email leaves from your computer in encrypted form, what is the point of failure as long as you are careful with your private key?
- corndoge 9y agoon a vps? why? sounds like a great way to make sure at least one entity has access to your mails, encrypted or not, whether you keep your privkey on a diff machine or not
- ekianjo 9y agoIf your emails are encrypted on a vps, they might have access to it but they sure won't be able to decrypt them anyway.