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> Unclear that diversifying helps solve this sort of problem. At least having the option of another vendor as a fallback (e.g. in case there's a severe RCE vul
by mschuster91 9y ago
> Unclear that diversifying helps solve this sort of problem.
At least having the option of another vendor as a fallback (e.g. in case there's a severe RCE vulnerability in ME/PSP) is a better alternative than having to shutter your entire business.
I would not be surprised if these management engines have a backdoor that can be invoked from a guest VM... and then an all-Intel (or all-AMD) shop has a massive problem.
- dogma1138 9y agoIntel ME drivers are not loaded into a VM, the devices are not exposed and the ME MSRs are also not exposed.
- mschuster91 9y ago> and the ME MSRs are also not exposed. This is the core question: is this isolation absolutely perfect, or can it be pierced in any way? Something on a severity level like Spectre/Meltdown - people would have laughed you off the stage half a year ago when you told 'em you could read kernel memory from Javascript without exploiting both the browser and the kernel - is IMHO certain to be present in either of the "management" solution, and I'd like to be prepared when the bomb explodes.
- dogma1138 9y agoI don’t think any serious security person would have laughed you off for mentioning side channel attacks. No isolation is perfect but and that is an important but for virtualization you have much higher control over what instruction you allow through so an attach which is specific to ME isn’t likely. That said you can have a side channel attack that allows you to compromise the hypervisor and from it you can jump to the ME but this is a different story.