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>At least it could describe some evidence in why there is a reasonable suspicion exists that something is wrong. The burden should be on the state to demonstra

>At least it could describe some evidence in why there is a reasonable suspicion exists that something is wrong. The burden should be on the state to demonstrate that voting is secure and accurate, especially given that they control the data and the processes, thereby making it more difficult for someone to present evidence. As it is, the state's position is circular: "we won't give you access to the information you need to prove something was amiss until you prove that something was amiss". But, even in the absence of someone questioning, the state should be able to show why there is no cause for concern in ways that allow the public and outside experts to verify for themselves. However, on the contrary, many precincts refuse to allow a paper trail/receipts and they continue to use machines that have demonstrated vulnerabilities, further obscuring the issue. It looks like this case may be prompting legislation that is moving in exactly this direction. That would be a positive outcome.

smsm42 9y ago
> The burden should be on the state to demonstrate that voting is secure and accurate It doesn't work this way. It can't. It's like I am saying "you are a reptiloid alien from planet Nibiru planning the conquest of Earth" and now the burden is on you to prove that you are human and not an alien wearing human skin as a costume. Normal people do not behave this way, and if you claim the election has been tampered with, you need to present at least some evidence why you think so. Otherwise you're just running your mouth (or keyboard) and blowing hot air. > As it is, the state's position is circular: "we won't give you access to the information you need to prove something Not true. She does claim there's evidence that something is wrong and she can prove it statistically - we just don't know what it is because there's no reporting on it. So we can not verify whether she is onto something or her statistics is junk and she's just trolling, in which case the state is right to refuse to spend time on her. > the state should be able to show why there is no cause for concern in ways that allow the public and outside experts to verify for themselves How would that look like? The vote is secret, for a reason, and if you do not trust the state mechanisms that collect that vote, how would you become convinced that the vote is accurate without some trust in the process? How that mechanism would look like? > they continue to use machines that have demonstrated vulnerabilities It is true that the machines have vulnerabilities, as do about 100% of computer equipment. Given that, I am not sure what your proposal it - not using computers at all and count everything by hand? What is the counters are dishonest too? How paper trail would help - personalized vote log is highly private information, and non-personalized one can easily be faked - how do you know if the system didn't report your vote for D as R and vice versa if you are just looking at the stream of Ds and Rs on the tape and don't know which is which? How do you make the system that demonstrably can not be tampered with while you have zero trust in hardware, software or people dealing with it? I don't think it is possible. Of course, there are mechanisms to prevent election fraud, and they are being used, but each of them involves a degree of trust and can be questioned, and I don't think any of them can be scientifically verified without destroying the privacy of the vote in the process.
- unclebucknasty 9y ago
  >It's like I am saying "you are a reptiloid alien from planet Nibiru planning the conquest of Earth" and now the burden is on you Your line of reasoning is valid--that a claimant cannot simply make an assertion and declare it true, simply because it cannot be disproven. But, what you're missing is that it's the state that is making the initial assertion: that voting is secure and accurate. So, they are the ones claiming the voters to be reptiloids. Pretty much the whole of your comment is undermined by this single misapplication of reasoning. But, I'll continue on a couple of other points... >Not true. She does claim there's evidence that something is wrong She's asserting statistical anomalies that can be clarified with additional information (i.e. a recount) that the state refuses to provide. But, that's not the point. Again, she's in this position based on a fallacious premise that you've accepted: the state's assertion of security without sufficient proof. >How would that look like? There are probably n technical solutions to this. A simple one would be paper-receipts with anonymous identifiers that tie votes to tallies published on-line. Anyone can look up their votes/results and/or download them to run analysis. Add a cryptographic hash to avoid forgeries. Speaking of hashes, there's also block-chain. >It is true that the machines have vulnerabilities, as do about 100% of computer equipment. Given that, I am not sure what your proposal is Your premise leads you to exactly the opposite of the conclusion that one would expect. That is, you acknowledge the problems, but conclude that it's acceptable for the approach to be trust in the system versus introducing corroborating processes or systems. I'm not sure if you know the degree to which vulns are a problem, but start by at least closing known vulnerabilities. Then, provide other validating factors that mitigate the shortcomings you acknowledge, whether via paper or otherwise. In any case, throwing our hands up and saying "it's hard, so let's stick with what we've got and declare it secure even in the face of challenges" is not the solution.
  - smsm42 9y ago
    > that voting is secure and accurate. So, they are the ones claiming the voters to be reptiloids. No, they are not. They are claiming the normal state of affairs - that the vote is what it appears to be, and the voters that appear humans are indeed humans. The challenger makes extraordinary claim - that some of them are instead not what they appear, but reptiloids wearing human skin as a costume. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Claim that humans are humans do not require proof. Claiming that voting process is not fraudulent is not extraordinary, since this is indeed a common case in vast majority of the situations. > She's asserting statistical anomalies that can be clarified with additional information Which anomalities? So far nobody named even one. > the state's assertion of security without sufficient proof. It's not a proof, just as I have no proof you are not a reptioloid from Nibiru trying to undermine human race by casting doubt on electoral processes. I just accept the normal case that you are human wanting honest elections, even with slightly misguided logic - because this is the common case. That's what you have to do to be sane - in fact, there's specific form of insanity where person suspects all surrounding him is an elaborated setup to trick them and demands extensive proofs of most mundane things like that drinking tap water won't instantly kill them and that their relatives are not secretly plotting to murder them - and it is almost always an extremely severe and debilitating condition. > A simple one would be paper-receipts with anonymous identifiers that tie votes to tallies published on-line. What prevents one from faking 10000 anonymous IDs voting for $ones_favorite_candidate? All anonymous IDs look alike, how do you verify they are true? In fact, sine you have no idea which of the IDs is yours, how you even know your vote has been recorded properly? How do you know the hardware just doesn't print one vote for $favorite_candidate after each vote against, with fake (or just unused - e.g. dead person's) ID? > Speaking of hashes, there's also block-chain. Oh of course. How could I forget, every problem in the world has one simple solution - use blockchain. > but start by at least closing known vulnerabilities Sure, that is sensible. But for that they should be known - and so far, the statistician in question didn't make them known, but only implied and hinted at. That's exactly my complain. When I say "there's RCE vulnerability in current version of Linux", you say "ok, show me the exploit", not "well, now it's on Linus Torvalds to prove there's no RCE in current version on Linux, and he must spend as much time as that guy wants to prove it to him". I would like to see the same approach in this case, that's all.

smsm42 9y ago

> The burden should be on the state to demonstrate that voting is secure and accurate It doesn't work this way. It can't. It's like I am saying "you are a reptiloid alien from planet Nibiru planning the conquest of Earth" and now the burden is on you to prove that you are human and not an alien wearing human skin as a costume. Normal people do not behave this way, and if you claim the election has been tampered with, you need to present at least some evidence why you think so. Otherwise you're just running your mouth (or keyboard) and blowing hot air. > As it is, the state's position is circular: "we won't give you access to the information you need to prove something Not true. She does claim there's evidence that something is wrong and she can prove it statistically - we just don't know what it is because there's no reporting on it. So we can not verify whether she is onto something or her statistics is junk and she's just trolling, in which case the state is right to refuse to spend time on her. > the state should be able to show why there is no cause for concern in ways that allow the public and outside experts to verify for themselves How would that look like? The vote is secret, for a reason, and if you do not trust the state mechanisms that collect that vote, how would you become convinced that the vote is accurate without some trust in the process? How that mechanism would look like? > they continue to use machines that have demonstrated vulnerabilities It is true that the machines have vulnerabilities, as do about 100% of computer equipment. Given that, I am not sure what your proposal it - not using computers at all and count everything by hand? What is the counters are dishonest too? How paper trail would help - personalized vote log is highly private information, and non-personalized one can easily be faked - how do you know if the system didn't report your vote for D as R and vice versa if you are just looking at the stream of Ds and Rs on the tape and don't know which is which? How do you make the system that demonstrably can not be tampered with while you have zero trust in hardware, software or people dealing with it? I don't think it is possible. Of course, there are mechanisms to prevent election fraud, and they are being used, but each of them involves a degree of trust and can be questioned, and I don't think any of them can be scientifically verified without destroying the privacy of the vote in the process.

unclebucknasty 9y ago
>It's like I am saying "you are a reptiloid alien from planet Nibiru planning the conquest of Earth" and now the burden is on you Your line of reasoning is valid--that a claimant cannot simply make an assertion and declare it true, simply because it cannot be disproven. But, what you're missing is that it's the state that is making the initial assertion: that voting is secure and accurate. So, they are the ones claiming the voters to be reptiloids. Pretty much the whole of your comment is undermined by this single misapplication of reasoning. But, I'll continue on a couple of other points... >Not true. She does claim there's evidence that something is wrong She's asserting statistical anomalies that can be clarified with additional information (i.e. a recount) that the state refuses to provide. But, that's not the point. Again, she's in this position based on a fallacious premise that you've accepted: the state's assertion of security without sufficient proof. >How would that look like? There are probably n technical solutions to this. A simple one would be paper-receipts with anonymous identifiers that tie votes to tallies published on-line. Anyone can look up their votes/results and/or download them to run analysis. Add a cryptographic hash to avoid forgeries. Speaking of hashes, there's also block-chain. >It is true that the machines have vulnerabilities, as do about 100% of computer equipment. Given that, I am not sure what your proposal is Your premise leads you to exactly the opposite of the conclusion that one would expect. That is, you acknowledge the problems, but conclude that it's acceptable for the approach to be trust in the system versus introducing corroborating processes or systems. I'm not sure if you know the degree to which vulns are a problem, but start by at least closing known vulnerabilities. Then, provide other validating factors that mitigate the shortcomings you acknowledge, whether via paper or otherwise. In any case, throwing our hands up and saying "it's hard, so let's stick with what we've got and declare it secure even in the face of challenges" is not the solution.
- smsm42 9y ago
  > that voting is secure and accurate. So, they are the ones claiming the voters to be reptiloids. No, they are not. They are claiming the normal state of affairs - that the vote is what it appears to be, and the voters that appear humans are indeed humans. The challenger makes extraordinary claim - that some of them are instead not what they appear, but reptiloids wearing human skin as a costume. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Claim that humans are humans do not require proof. Claiming that voting process is not fraudulent is not extraordinary, since this is indeed a common case in vast majority of the situations. > She's asserting statistical anomalies that can be clarified with additional information Which anomalities? So far nobody named even one. > the state's assertion of security without sufficient proof. It's not a proof, just as I have no proof you are not a reptioloid from Nibiru trying to undermine human race by casting doubt on electoral processes. I just accept the normal case that you are human wanting honest elections, even with slightly misguided logic - because this is the common case. That's what you have to do to be sane - in fact, there's specific form of insanity where person suspects all surrounding him is an elaborated setup to trick them and demands extensive proofs of most mundane things like that drinking tap water won't instantly kill them and that their relatives are not secretly plotting to murder them - and it is almost always an extremely severe and debilitating condition. > A simple one would be paper-receipts with anonymous identifiers that tie votes to tallies published on-line. What prevents one from faking 10000 anonymous IDs voting for $ones_favorite_candidate? All anonymous IDs look alike, how do you verify they are true? In fact, sine you have no idea which of the IDs is yours, how you even know your vote has been recorded properly? How do you know the hardware just doesn't print one vote for $favorite_candidate after each vote against, with fake (or just unused - e.g. dead person's) ID? > Speaking of hashes, there's also block-chain. Oh of course. How could I forget, every problem in the world has one simple solution - use blockchain. > but start by at least closing known vulnerabilities Sure, that is sensible. But for that they should be known - and so far, the statistician in question didn't make them known, but only implied and hinted at. That's exactly my complain. When I say "there's RCE vulnerability in current version of Linux", you say "ok, show me the exploit", not "well, now it's on Linus Torvalds to prove there's no RCE in current version on Linux, and he must spend as much time as that guy wants to prove it to him". I would like to see the same approach in this case, that's all.