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NeuG USB True Random Number Generator
- AdmiralAsshat 9y agoDon't we already have "true" random number generators embedded on most modern processors? I was under the impression most motherboards have some sensors strictly for this purpose--to read data from static or thermal sensors in order to add entropy to the pool.
- brndnmtthws 9y agoIntel CPUs do indeed have a random number generator onboard: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RdRand https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RdRand Probably the safest thing to do is to use a combination of this and other sources (multiple entropy sources), just in case there's an NSA backdoor or it's otherwise broken. Things like microphones, cameras, input devices, and other sensors are nearly ubiquitous now.
- nfoz 9y agoIs there any trick to combining entropy sources? Do you just add the numbers together, or is it something more involved, to make sure that you -- I don't know -- collapse entropy away in the combination, or something.
- brndnmtthws 9y agoYou pretty much just mash everything together, then feed the output back into itself, and do it again, and again, and again...
- nspaced 9y agoThe joint entropy of two random variables is never less than the individual entropies.
- randomnumber42 9y agoWhile that's true, just blindly mixing all you've got is a bad idea. Let's say you have "randomness" sources A, B, C and D, and you just use A+B+C+D. Now an attacker has total control over D. Then she could adaptively feed you with a D value that is canceling out A, B and C. Result is deterministic output. Just adding in more is not always good. You need to trust every source. Or more precisely: You need at least one source in the mix that an attacker can't predict/read out.
- brndnmtthws 9y agoHow you weight the entropy sources should be a function of the entropy sources, making it much more difficult to predict.
- wahern 9y agoWeighting functions are useless. If you mix entropy properly, in the absence of an _active_ attacker, the output will be no worse than the best entropy source. In the presence of an attacker they're just as useless, if not pernicious. Modern PRNG frameworks moved away from weighting years ago[1] because it not only has dubious benefit, but engineers suck at estimating entropy, so the estimates created a false sense of security. For example, the entropy estimates for hard drives were for a long time based on a single research publication, which as hard drives evolved over the years became increasingly irrelevant--assuming it wasn't irrelevant the day after it was published. Kernel engineers would try to add conservative margins, but if the original quantity has no basis in reality those efforts are just hand-waving. This is pretty much how all entropy estimates go. The research that goes into the estimates can be extremely rigorous and sound. The problem is not only ensuring the estimates are relevant to your mix of hardware, but that they remain relevant over time. New designs and new manufacturing methods come online on an almost daily basis, even for what appear to be identical products. Combined with the dubious benefit at the outset, trying to maintain the integrity of the estimates is little more than a fool's errand. With the exception of first-boot behavior, where you want to ensure there's "enough"[1] initial entropy, even accurate estimates don't provide any substantive value. Rather, mixing in a continuous stream of new entropy after you've gathered 128 or 256 bits can actually expose you to other issues, like exfiltration attacks that are more difficult to detect than they otherwise would be. (See https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html) Because of the intrinsic difficulty of maintaining accurate estimates, some people would argue that the proper way to solve the first-boot issue is to not solve it at all. The only proper solution is an on-board, robust entropy source. Anything else provides a false sense of security (eventually if not initially), disincentivizing demand for and supply of systems with an on-board source.[2] The Via C3, circa 2003, provided the first on-chip source in the commodity x86 space. Unfortunately it took Intel over a decade to add the similar RDRAND, and longer still to make it ubiquitous across their product line. Now that AMD provides RDRAND and most ARM chips have something similar, we're nearly at a point where there's no excuse for entropy collection and estimation contrivances. IoT devices and other lower-end devices are still problematic, but those devices provide little if any hardware that entropy collection and estimation proponents can play with. Dealing with the long tail of legacy hardware is also a PITA. The PCEngines ALIX used an AMD SoC platform (Geode LX800) with an RNG source, but the more recent APU (G-series T40 and GX-412) lacks any on-board source.[3] This issue will eventually pass, but in the meantime solutions like the NeuG provide a solution. Which isn't to say that's the only use for NeuG. There's nothing wrong with using NeuG to supplement the vendor's RNG, just keep in mind issues like exfiltration attacks for trying to use too much of a good thing. [1] Compare Yarrow (1999) to Fortuna (2003). [2] By on-board I mean either on the chip, on a controller (both AMD and Intel put RNG sources on some select I/O controllers), or on a pre-installed device (e.g. HSM module on high-end Unix boxes). [3] There might actually be one on the NIC controller. I haven't been able to confirm, and in any event it's not detected by the OS and thus unsupported presuming there is one. Which alludes to another issue--the complexity created by supporting so many different mechanisms. All these device drivers and frameworks add attack surface.
- benchaney 9y agoYou can basically just feed the various inputs in to a hash function. Of course, this imposes an upper bound on the amount of entropy if the output in the form of the length of the hash function output, but this is rarely an issue in practice. Edit: Of course, this introduces the assumption that your hash function is secure, but again, not a problem in practice.
- endymi0n 9y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator#Software_whitening https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generat... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_extractor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_extractor ...the easiest is the von Neumann extractor where you just extract a zero if both randomness sources are zero, do the same thing for ones and discard all the differences. Half the output with more entropy than any single connected source (if they can't read or influence each other).
- tempay 9y agoIsn't this something different? I thought the simple solution was to xor the two sources, which is at least a secure the best source?
- sowbug 9y agoYou might be interested in reading about Fortuna https://www.schneier.com/academic/fortuna/ https://www.schneier.com/academic/fortuna/. It's an example of a class of PRNGs that are explicitly designed to generate cryptographically secure random numbers from a pool of sources including sources under an attacker's control. I don't know the first thing about cryptanalysis, but what I gather from skimming the PDF is that yes, it's possible to advantageously influence a PRNG with bad inputs if the mixer sucks.
- tptacek 9y agoThis is a feature of basically every modern CSPRNG and a basic consequence of the crypto primitives we use to design CSPRNGs.
- sowbug 9y agoThat's good to hear. It seems intuitive that it should be impractical to usefully influence randomness; if I can predict anything after a whitening step, isn't that whitening step horribly broken? But I've learned to squelch my intuition when it comes to cryptography. (Now would be a great time to plug Matasano...)
- dfox 9y agoFor cryptographic applications you generally just hash every input you have together with secure hash function. Somewhat philosophical corollary to that is that when you have hash function that is secure enough for your application you can just build CSPRNG from it and use small (eg. 128 or 256 bit) seed and you have no need for hardware RNG.
- tptacek 9y agoYes, modulo the fact that you want to update the CSPRNG with new entropy continuously to re-key it. Not to improve the cryptographic strength of the output or (for God's sake) to avoid "depletion", but to create forward secrecy. For instance: if the interval between reseedings is short enough, because updates are super cheap, you can make your RNG state churn too fast to be a useful target for something like Meltdown.
- dfox 9y agoYes, but you don't need some dedicated source of high-bandwith random noise for that, using sources that already exist in essentially any system is almost certainly sufficient.
- tptacek 9y agoYep.
- pvg 9y agoHow does reseeding the CSPRNG create forward secrecy? I thought that if someone lifts your CSPRNG internal state (after it's been seeded and the seed tossed), they wouldn't be able to play it backwards to get previous output you've used as session keys or whatever.
- tptacek 9y agoI'm abusing the term, I know. But the idea is simple, right? Even a minuscule update to the kernel entropy pool makes a previously compromised state unusable. So you don't want your CSPRNG to just be a bit generator, like HMAC or CTR. (Zvi Gutterman refers to the property I'm talking about as "backwards security", so my abuse of the term is particularly egregious).
- Cyberdog 9y agoKeyboard typing, mouse/camera movements, timings, sure. But arbitrarily reading data from my camera or microphone, even for the well-intentioned purpose of generating entropy… no thank you.
- brndnmtthws 9y agoCameras are actually a fantastic source of entropy because the CMOS sensors produce high quality and very random data in the form of noise. You can crank up the sensitivity (ISO) and get even more.
- cleeus 9y agoIncreasing the ISO is just a multiplication of the raw sensor value - it doesn't lead to more noise - it just makes it visible to the human eye. Also on my DSLR I can see all kinds of stripes and cross patterns in the noise, so a lot of it is not really random but based on static sensor properties.
- brndnmtthws 9y agoFair enough, it is indeed just an amplifier, but what I was trying to say is that the noise becomes quite visually apparent when you increase the ISO.
- iotscale 9y agoyou can cancel out static noise with multiple readings
- sowbug 9y agoThe hardware is open, so you can put other programs on it as well, such as Gnuk http://www.fsij.org/doc-gnuk/ http://www.fsij.org/doc-gnuk/, which is more or less like the OpenPGP smart card feature of a Yubikey. As with a lot of OSHW products, they often don't make financial sense when compared to mass-market equivalents. But they have intangible advantages over them, not all of which everyone cares about.
- Chaebixi 9y ago> Don't we already have "true" random number generators embedded on most modern processors? I was under the impression most motherboards have some sensors strictly for this purpose--to read data from static or thermal sensors in order to add entropy to the pool. Paranoid people might fear that those have been compromised à la Dual_EC_DRBG.
- sowbug 9y agoThis is also available at Seeed Studio: https://www.seeedstudio.com/FST-01-without-Enclosure-p-1276.html https://www.seeedstudio.com/FST-01-without-Enclosure-p-1276.... By the time you read this, it'll probably be sold out, but I coincidentally signed up about a week ago to be notified when they were in stock, and I got that notification yesterday. It's also possible to have MacroFab https://macrofab.com/ https://macrofab.com/ manufacture these for you on demand, using the KiCad files: http://git.gniibe.org/gitweb/?p=gnuk/gnuk.git http://git.gniibe.org/gitweb/?p=gnuk/gnuk.git The cost for a single unit is about $45, and it drops quickly to around $30 if you order a few.
- solotronics 9y agoI got the last one on Seeed Studio :]
- busterarm 9y agoSo it was you! lol. Enjoy!
- busterarm 9y agoBlast. I read this, it was in stock, I added to my cart...then the office lunch order showed up and I had to deal with the delivery for 5 minutes. Came back, out of stock. So sad.
- sowbug 9y agoIf your goal was a small hardware RNG and you don't mind spending some time hacking, then I can save you some money. Buy an ST103F development board ($1.72 shipped to US from China): https://www.aliexpress.com/item/1pcs-STM32F103C8T6-ARM-STM32-Minimum-System-Development-Board-Module-raspberry-raspberri-pi-2-watch-nmd-diy/32786765274.html https://www.aliexpress.com/item/1pcs-STM32F103C8T6-ARM-STM32... Also buy an STLink programmer for it ($1.98 shipped): https://www.aliexpress.com/item/ST-Link-V2-Programming-Unit-mini-STM8-STM32-Emulator-Downloader-M89-New/32636724482.html https://www.aliexpress.com/item/ST-Link-V2-Programming-Unit-... Build https://github.com/texane/stlink/ https://github.com/texane/stlink/ or install OpenOCD. Clone the NeuG repo and build for the Maple Mini target: https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/gnuk/gnuk/neug.git/ https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/gnuk/gnuk/neug.git/ Now flash neug.bin to the development board via the STLink, then unplug it and plug the board into your nearest micro-USB cable. You now have a hardware RNG running the same NeuG software on the same processor family as the FST-01. This board doesn't have enough program space to run GnuK, I think. Nor is it in the tiny form factor of the FST-01 that makes it more suitable as a hardware token.
- madengr 9y agoWhy not just sample a noise diode, or thermal noise from a highly amplified resistor? Is the process of amplification (i.e. periodic power supply noise) enough to influence the randomness?
- sigstoat 9y agowhy do you think that's simpler than what they're doing? you'd still have to feed that through something to get it into a PC. the STM32 is about the cheapest way of doing that. and it turns out it comes with some ADCs that are so noisy they're good sources of randomness themselves.
- IWeldMelons 9y agoThe cheapest way is to use good old soundcard, an opamp and passives. You could fit in $1 easily.
- IWeldMelons 9y agomost of HN readers are not familiar with EE, unfortunately.
- lazylester 9y agoYes this is exactly what you need to do. And yes it takes some careful design to eliminate power supply noise. NeuG has some low quality sources of entropy, and also provides analog input for the user to supply with whatever they wish. It does not address the design of a good white noise generator, unfortunately.
- kozak 9y agoShoot some photographs (or video frames), make sure there are no duplicates, take hash functions of them, delete the images - and voila, you have the finest true random bits of data.
- cleeus 9y agoIt's not that simple. Some years ago I used an analog TV card tuned to an empty channel that was giving seemingly white noise and captured frames to generate entropy. I only used the least significant bit of each RGB value of each pixel. When I supplied the bits to the diehard testsuite, it complained about a number of patterns and failing tests. The hash function will of course save you, but it's hard to tell the amount of real randomness that's coming from the sensor. update: Oh, I may have misunderstood. If the whole images changes in random ways and is secret, then of course this is fine.
- samat 9y agoYou need some additional processing, otherwise ‘intellectual image processing’ in modern digital cameras will fuck you up big time.
- XnoiVeX 9y agoThat's exactly what CloudFlare does with their lava lamps. https://blog.cloudflare.com/lavarand-in-production-the-nitty-gritty-technical-details/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/lavarand-in-production-the-nitty...
- alex_young 9y agoOr just grab some hotbits: https://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/ https://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/
- starsinspace 9y agoWeird how they specifically point out "free as in freedom", but then the real brain of this entire thing is a proprietary STM32F103 MCU.
- throwawayfinal 9y agoThey say the design of the product, not the components are free, if we're going to be pedantic.
- bb88 9y agoTo be fair, yes, the proprietary nature of a particular chip is bad for open source, but on the other hand, the marginal cost of a chip is not zero, like it is for software. There's the chip fabrication costs which only goes down in quantity. That means there's an inherent risk in developing a new chip. However, if you're that concerned about it, there are open source designs which create free truly random bits, so you are free to choose a design that meets your need.
- tonyarkles 9y agoAdditionally, and I'm not positive that they've actually done this, but the chip also has fully open toolchain. While the guts of the chip aren't open source, it's possible for the firmware to be 100% open source without any binary blobs.
- mmagin 9y agoYeah, we don't trust RDRAND but we trust this?
- hannob 9y agoControversial opinion: Hardware Random Number Generators don't solve any real problem. The problems they're supposed to solve are entirely fictional and usually stem from a poor understanding of the real problems there are with random numbers (which can mostly be traced back to a few issues: boot time entropy, userspace RNGs and use of insecure RNGs by mistake).
- raverbashing 9y agoHow are you supposed to get entropy into a system with no (good for RNG) inputs and no sources of noise? (think: embedded)
- tptacek 9y agoNot with a USB HWRNG.
- schoen 9y agoI don't understand this part of your criticism. Your core criticism has been that we don't really need hardware TRNGs because the math of CSPRNGs doesn't lead to "entropy depletion" in the way that people's mistaken mental models might suggest. That's fine, but boot-time seeding problems are also a real source of RNG-related security problems, as described in the "Mining Your Ps and Qs" paper. (E.g. "The removal of IRQs as an entropy source has likely exacerbated RNG problems in headless and embedded devices, which often lack human input devices, disks, and multiple cores. If they do, the only source of entropy—if there are any at all—may be the time of boot.") Having a hardware TRNG for seeding in this case would presumably prevent these problems.
- loeg 9y agoEmbedded systems may be physically small enough that plugging in a USB key doesn't make any sense. An embedded HWTRNG chip onboard or in the SoC may make sense.
- 9y ago
- Tomte 9y agoHardware random number generators sound like a great idea (I've bought an Entropy Key, long ago), until you realize all the problems they intrinsically have (besides all that "you don't need them stuff"): * software has /no/ random failures, hardware does * hardware ages and breaks down, often in subtle ways * a broken down randomness engine is very hard to detect, since all HWRNGs do some whitening: your randomness source can output 1's all the livelong day, when you only see the output of some stream cipher operation or some chained hashes, no statistic tests are going to save you * probably many more things Hm, I really should consolidate my notes into that long-planned HWRNG article someday.
- martin1975 9y agoI like how they call it a 'true' RNG... unless it's got a cesium core and a Geiger counter mounted on the USB, I'd hardly call it 'true' :). At best, it's good enough.
- jdtang13 9y agoI agree, this is a misleading use of the word "true". It's more like "relatively true RNG" than "true".
- lhkdfsakhljd 9y agoWhy so? I see this written quite a bit, but it doesn't square with what my phys undergrad... There are many sources of truly random events (as in quantum), including tunneling in diodes. Then there are chaotic systems which are good enough to be random. There, even in a deterministic universe (it doesn't appear to be) and given infinite amount of computational power (impossible), you'd still be unable predict the future (due to measurement error). TRNG are hard to do correctly, but why are they limited to geiger counters and radioactive mtls? Is it because you can't "hack" the nuclear core (not exactly true, but sure)? Again that would be a doing the TRNG right, not a lack of randomness in physical systems.
- Tomte 9y agoWhy do you think that radioactive decay is the only "true" noise source? Shot noise, avalanche noise etc. are just as true. Even throwing a die would be in the same category.
- martin1975 9y agoEven the roll of a die could be called non-random, since the numbers that come up are actually the result of a number of forces acting together on the die, including the force of the rollers hand, gravity, air gusts, the surface they fall on, etc. Same principle would apply to all the other methods you mentioned since there's always a definite seed value, regardless of how difficult it is for you or another observer to capture it. All the approaches you listed would result in quality pseudo-random numbers, however, a genuine random number at the source has no apparent cause or series of events leading up to it. Cesium is one such source of genuine, uninspired and uninfluenced source of randomness. Cosmic radiation is probably another although that's probably a lot harder to capture. Here's a more detailed explanation of why radiation from radioactive decay is bona fide random. https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/breaking/2009/03/30/real-random https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/breaking/2009/03/30/real-ra... https://engineering.mit.edu/engage/ask-an-engineer/can-a-computer-generate-a-truly-random-number/ https://engineering.mit.edu/engage/ask-an-engineer/can-a-com... The NeuG is best described as a high quality PRNG as are most others unless they truly capture some random, cosmic phenomena, like echoes from the big bang detectable as cosmic background radiation.. Allegedly nothing tops the big bang as a random number generator.