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I think people have tried, and the only meaningful success has come from approaches that build key management into the mail client and make it transparent. At
by kelnos 9y ago
I think people have tried, and the only meaningful success has come from approaches that build key management into the mail client and make it transparent. At first blush this seems great, but there are drawbacks that make it not worth that much:
1) For a web-based client, the keypair is stored out of the user's control, so it ends up meaning you're outsourcing trust to a third party, not just that they're trustworthy, but that they'll never experience a breach.
2) For a local client, the keypair isn't backed up anywhere, so if the user switches computers or suffers a hardware failure, the key is gone. These days you can mitigate that issue by integrating a cloud backup feature, but then you're risking that the user is protecting the private key with a weak password (which I'd expect to be common). I expect that most people don't use thick clients these days, outside of corporate use that mandates Exchange/Outlook or something similar.
3) You don't get the benefits of the web of trust. These sorts of users will never go to a key-signing party or anything like that, so one of the stated goals of OpenPGP -- that you can examine that web to feel safe that you're actually communicating with whom you think you are -- just falls away.
- lmm 9y ago> I think people have tried, and the only meaningful success has come from approaches that build key management into the mail client and make it transparent. At first blush this seems great, but there are drawbacks that make it not worth that much: I'd say no-one has tried at the level of committing significant resources to it - i.e. a couple of full-time developers/designers. Certainly not the level of investment that Signal has got. > 2) For a local client, the keypair isn't backed up anywhere, so if the user switches computers or suffers a hardware failure, the key is gone. These days you can mitigate that issue by integrating a cloud backup feature, but then you're risking that the user is protecting the private key with a weak password (which I'd expect to be common). I expect that most people don't use thick clients these days, outside of corporate use that mandates Exchange/Outlook or something similar. All true. I'd hope that hardware tokens (Yubikey et al) could offer a solution, if we could agree on a standard for them. A good "web crypto" API would also be a huge help - browsers are more willing to add new APIs these days, so something like an encrypted input field where the cryptography is managed by the browser and the far side never sees the plaintext is a bit more feasible. Also the rise of bitcoin means people are having to get used to the level of key/passphrase security necessary for securing genuinely valuable things - we're seeing a new wave of interest in things like SSSS split keys. There are serious challenges, but there's room for hope as well. > 3) You don't get the benefits of the web of trust. These sorts of users will never go to a key-signing party or anything like that, so one of the stated goals of OpenPGP -- that you can examine that web to feel safe that you're actually communicating with whom you think you are -- just falls away. True, though there are also a lot more ways identities could be passed around these days. When Keybase started I dared to hope they'd help improve the OpenPGP ecosystem, though they seem to have gone down the opposite track now.
- kelnos 9y agoI think the downside of many approaches is the "lose it and it's gone forever" aspect. Users just aren't used to that failure case. There's always a password reset link that gets you back where you started. If you have PGP-encrypted mail and you lose access to the private key, you've lost access to that mail forever, and that's still not a very well-understood concept to many people. Awareness of this sort of thing is certainly getting better, but arguably we aren't to a point where your average user is comfortable with that yet, and we certainly weren't there back when OpenPGP was first designed.