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In the world of crypto we've known about cache timing issues forever. Writing cryptographic algorithm implementations so that they are constant-time is really
by cryptonector 9y ago
In the world of crypto we've known about cache timing issues forever. Writing cryptographic algorithm implementations so that they are constant-time is really hard, but also always the goal nowadays, as timing side-channels are and long have been a big deal.
What's new here is exploitation of speculative execution (branch prediction). It takes what was already difficult in the world of crypto to a new level of difficulty (or maybe not; it looks like the fix for this will be to effectively disable branch prediction in sensitive code, or even preferably by default and enable it only where it's necessary and safe).
- gefh 9y agoI think you need to disable branch prediction on any core that has access to sensitive memory, not just during the execution of sensitive code. It's 'untrusted' code running on the same machine that you need to worry about.
- olfactory 9y agoWhat would be the sales pitch within the NSA to create tooling to allow this sort of stuff to be exploited for useful intelligence purposes? What would the tooling look like, how would it be used, etc?