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Except for that whole web thing that has most of the world running untrusted code just about every minute of every day Certainly those who e.g. have JS off by
by userbinator 9y ago
Except for that whole web thing that has most of the world running untrusted code just about every minute of every day
Certainly those who e.g. have JS off by default are currently in the minority, but perhaps this will be the defining event that causes everyone else to think more deeply about letting untrusted code run, regardless of how sandboxed it is.
Things like TEMPEST[1] have shown for many years that side-channel attacks are extremely difficult to defend against, even for an attacker who is merely in proximity to the hardware and can't influence it at all; nevermind running code directly on it. It was only a matter of time. A lot of malware researchers already don't trust VMs and use separate physical hardware, precisely because of these risks of sharing trusted and untrusted code on the same hardware.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST
- adjkant 9y ago> but perhaps this will be the defining event that causes everyone else to think more deeply about letting untrusted code run, regardless of how sandboxed it is. Your average user: Javascript is on the website not on my computer so it's fine.
- continuational 9y agoSuch users simply expect the computer they bought to work as advertised. Is it really their fault when it can’t run a browser correctly?
- robin_reala 9y agoYour average user: what’s a Javascript?
- continuational 9y agoThere’s not a single program that i trust. Not even the programs I’ve written myself; even taken all reasonable precautions, it’s far too easy to introduce a vulnerability. There are programs that I choose to run with escalated privileges, like the operating system, out of necessity. If I can’t run untrusted code; I simply can’t compute. It’s the main thing hardware is designed to do.
- andrewem 9y agoFor instance, even if you read your compiler's source code and then compile it, there's no way to know that the compilation process didn't insert a back door, as in this classic essay: https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp...
- bmm6o 9y agoI'm not saying you're wrong, but you seem to be using a different definition of untrusted than the rest of the thread. Your code may not be perfect, but you certainly don't suspect it's launching a timing attack against your machine's kernel, and exfiltrating what it discovers, right?
- leoc 9y agoSorry, but no way. Local execution of sandboxed or VMed code isn't going away, and shouldn't go away, and suggesting that it should or will is honestly a bit deformation professionnelle, not to say a tiny bit crackers. Neither Spectre nor several more Spectres will change that. Computing mostly got along fine without sandboxing in the 'Seventies, but it could do so because computing in the 'Seventies was a radically different world for many other reasons too. We need more, and more reliable, sandboxing not less. If that means that, for instance, hardware manufacturers have to start getting serious about relative timing guarantees instead of cheerfully doing whatever it takes to beat the benchmarks, well Too Bad Really. It's a direction that things should probably have been going in anyway in the interests of real-time perfomance guarantees.
- nine_k 9y agoIBM offered VM-level sandboxing back then, starting from s/370 hardware in 1972. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VM_(operating_system) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VM_(operating_system)