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Vulnerability of Speculative Processors to Cache Timing Side-Channel Mechanism
- Scene_Cast2 9y agoThe site isn't loading, and there's no google cache yet. Does anyone have a rip or mirror?
- wyldfire 9y ago> Vulnerability of Speculative Processors to Cache Timing Side-Channel Mechanism > Updated on 03/Jan/2018 > Based on the recent research findings from Google on the potential new cache timing side-channels exploiting processor speculation, here is the latest information on possible Arm processors impacted and their potential mitigations. We will post any new research findings here as needed. > Cache timing side-channels are a well-understood concept in the area of security research and therefore not a new finding. However, this side-channel mechanism could enable someone to potentially extract some information that otherwise would not be accessible to software from processors that are performing as designed and not based on a flaw or bug. This is the issue addressed here and in the Cache Speculation Side-channels whitepaper. > It is important to note that this method is dependent on malware running locally which means it's imperative for users to practice good security hygiene by keeping their software up-to-date and avoid suspicious links or downloads. > The majority of Arm processors are not impacted by any variation of this side-channel speculation mechanism. A definitive list of the small subset of Arm-designed processors that are susceptible can be found below.
- robxu9 9y agoSite as an image: https://imgur.com/B15WzJZ https://imgur.com/B15WzJZ
- Rebelgecko 9y agoIt loaded after a minute or two for me, but if that isn't working try this: http://archive.is/jVCwc http://archive.is/jVCwc
- omeid2 9y agoFun fact: The website linked most probably runs on Intel CPUs as it seems to be hosted on Azure. Azure doesn't offer Ryzen VMs yet. And here is an archived link: http://archive.is/jVCwc http://archive.is/jVCwc
- sandworm101 9y agoI wonder if we will ever see a bug dangerous enough to cause clouds to shut down so many machines that it is impossible to get the word out about a fix.
- thrillgore 9y ago2018 is off to a great start.
- bitmapbrother 9y agoEspecially for Google's Project Zero.
- nasredin 9y agoProject Zero AKA Google is probably a better choice than "Tailored Access" guys at the NSA or their Russian or Chinese equivalents.
- mrmondo 9y agoAlmost as disgusting as Intel's response. > "It is important to note that this method is dependent on malware running locally which means it's imperative for users to practice good security hygiene by keeping their software up-to-date and avoid suspicious links or downloads." If you're running something on your ARM CPU, it's running locally!, they're using careful language to make the problem seem to impact them less than it does and lay the blame on the user. This affects a huge number of processors out there, not just in phones and tablets but in embedded, industrial and network devices - many of which will never seem workarounds from their OS / software for the hardware fault. Also OH: "The bug doesn’t happen if you don’t use our product"
- ENOTTY 9y agoNone of the Cortex M cores seem to be affected, according to ARM. These are the ones mostly used in embedded applications.
- andrewcchen 9y agoCortex M cores don't have MMUs, so they cannot be affected. Also in embedded applications you would only be running trusted code anyway
- sitharus 9y agoThe MMU isn't part of this attack, and there are ARM cores with MMUs that are not affected. Cortex M cores are in-order CPUs, so they do not have branch prediction or perform speculative execution which the attacks rely on.
- userbinator 9y agoThe attack is all about bypassing memory protection, which without an MMU to provide any, is moot --- code has access to all of memory to read normally anyway.
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- cududa 9y agoWhite paper direct link as the site seems to be under heavy load: https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/Cache_Speculation_Side-channels.pdf?revision=966364ce-10aa-4580-8431-7e4ed42fb90b&la=en https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/Cache_Speculatio...
- monocasa 9y ago> All future Arm Cortex processors will be resilient to this style of attack or allow mitigation through kernel patches. Lol, 'we may or may not fix our HDL.'
- MarkSweep 9y agoThe whitepaper linked from this article introduces a new memory barrier named "CSDB". Does this work with existing ARM CPUs, and if so, how? I guess they could have always had this instruction encoding defined but just never gave it a name, but the seems a little odd.
- palotasb 9y agoAccording to the table here [1] it is a DSB (data synch barrier) instruction. I don't know if it corresponds to any of the listed valid option values in [2]. [1] http://kitoslab-eng.blogspot.nl/2012/10/armv8-aarch64-instruction-encoding.html http://kitoslab-eng.blogspot.nl/2012/10/armv8-aarch64-instru... [2] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dui0802b/CIHGHHIE.html http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dui0802b/CI...
- mrep 9y ago> However, this side-channel mechanism could enable someone to potentially extract some information that otherwise would not be accessible to software from processors that are performing as designed and not based on a flaw or bug. "performing as designed and not based on a flaw or bug" I have no words...
- Rebelgecko 9y agoMaybe it's just because this is a more technical update, but the responses from Intel[1] and AMD really seem like night and day to me. This page is for the most part clearly written and only has a minimal amount of BS before getting to the point about: • identifying the problems (without casting aspersions on other vendors or being FUD-y about issues that don't exist) • specifying what _specific_ hardware is vulnerable • info for developers (here's the patches you need if you're building your own kernel, here's a new compiler intrinsic that will be available soon for your applications, here [2] is code to implement the intrinsic yourself if you're not able to update your compiler) • slightly less useful info for end users (update your stuff, which isn't necessarily actionable advice for some of us on Android) • lets us know that future hardware may still require the KPTI patches, but it sounds like the speculative execution issues that aren't fixed by the patches ("variant 1") will be fixed in hardware Things that still aren't great: • no mention of performance impact of their various mitigation strategies that surely someone would have benchmarked in the 6 months they've been working on this. However I'm sure before too much longer someone will grab that code from their github and compare it to regular memory accesses • this FAQ purporting to be in layman's terms definitely isn't [3]. Imagine telling your elderly relative that saw an article about scary computer bugs in the New York Times that the problem is just a "novel use of an existing side-channel technique" to "access data from privileged memory (DRAM or CPU cache)." [1] https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-responds-to-security-research-findings/ https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-responds-to-security-r... [2] https://github.com/ARM-software/speculation-barrier/blob/master/speculation_barrier.h https://github.com/ARM-software/speculation-barrier/blob/mas... [3] https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update/frequently-asked-questions https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update/frequently...
- chmod775 9y agoNitpick: This is Arm's press release, not AMD's.
- sargun 9y agoDoes TrustZone mitigate this? Can the secure world be compromised via this side channel?
- bryanbuckley 9y agoYour question is a bit too vague. TrustZone by itself doesn't really give you anything. For instance, by default you run everything w/ TrustZone bit set unless you do something different during boot. In general, I would say TrustZone is not special at all (yet) in regards to immunity to side-channel attacks. See: https://twitter.com/bryanbuckley/status/912458210191093760 https://twitter.com/bryanbuckley/status/912458210191093760 On the other hand, TZ (NS bit) was a bit special for ARM so maybe they paid more attention to it (i.e. maybe it matters greatly that addresses are tagged NS/S for the HW, unlike x86 which was not designed to consider addresses part of securable boundary between modes/rings?). Or maybe ARM still opted for speed over security, in some surprising/disappointing ways. However, that may be a moot point if you can execute arbitrary code in SWd and if something like Spectre might leak SWd usr to SWd usr (since you could then use normal communication between the SWd/NWd)? Of course folks will experiment and we will know in the coming months.. if a TEE vendor does not first make a comment (e.g. linaro). Also remember that the TEE folks have different OSes (some are micro-kernels that are more security-focused). Curiously, I saw the blog post in August last year and it reminded that it was during OMAP5 bring-up that I think I sent my first ever patch to lkml, dealing with aborts being spammed (being originated via speculation; aborting because we had a region of memory dedicated for TZ). A15 had introduced a deeper branch prediction buffer, iianm. I can't find the final patch. Hopefully my sign-off was just omitted rather than the commit living in some OMAP specific fork. My RFC patch was pretty dumb (basically I disabled speculation during early linux loading, re-enabled once "the real" page tables were ready to activate) so better programmers took the helm and I confirmed the fix.. So anyway.. at least on OMAP the hardware _seemed_ to disallow any access at all across TZ boundary, even by hardware. Then again, you can't really trust this reporting/aborting (good sign at though) and would have to verify yourself w/ some PoC attack. And obligatory mention that The Mill seems like a better CPU arch.
- deckard1 9y ago> However, this side-channel mechanism could enable someone to potentially extract some information that otherwise would not be accessible to software from processors that are performing as designed and not based on a flaw or bug. I'm having trouble parsing this bit of lawyer speak. In the prior sentence they say nothing is new. Then in this sentence, they are saying that there is something new. I'd say "potentially extract information that would not be accessible" as definitely not "performing as designed" unless it were "based on a flaw or bug." That is, if you take security seriously. I mean, how could it not be? Are you saying that this attack is by design? Is... is this an NSA canary? Did you guys just admit that this is not a flaw by design? Blink once if the men in black are listening, twice if they know we know they are listening.
- ealexhudson 9y agoTo be honest, they're saying two things which are both simultaneously true: * you can access information that, by design, the processor would ordinarily prevent access to * the fault is not a flaw or bug, but inherent in the design of the processor The intent of the design was to keep the information secure, and the features of the design to do that are working as intended. Other features of the design, intended to increase performance, are also working correctly, but turn out to leak information in certain circumstances. There's no clear analogy in the physical world I can think of, but I don't think this is weasel-speak. Exfiltration of data accidentally through a side-channel, like here, is very difficult to design against.
- noway421 9y ago"We succeeded on the design of it, but failed on the security goal."
- DCKing 9y agoOof. The Cortex-A75 has a hardware security bug before any silicon with it has been released. On the other hand, this luckily means that software mitigations can be included before release. Luckily for most unpatched Android phones, they use Cortex A53 and Cortex A7 in-order chips which are not affected because they lack the speculative execution required for this vulnerability.
- Symmetry 9y agoCortex A53 certainly have speculative execution because they have branch predictors. The branch predictor of the A53 is probably the most sophisticated thing about it and other in-order ARM cores like the A8 are vulnerable. But apparently something about the A53 design prevents speculating of indirect loads making them safe.
- fulafel 9y agoSpeculative execution in computer architecture terminology is reserved for speculating past branches.
- Symmetry 9y agoYes, and the A53 speculatively executes past branches, otherwise there's little point in having a branch predictor. The difference between it and an out of order processor is that the depth of speculation is limited by the pipeline length rather than the reorder buffer. EDIT: The pipeline layout severely constrains what sort of speculation can happen and, thinking about it more, I'm really surprised that the A8 can finish load and issue a second one before the mis-speculated branch is resolved and the loads are quashed. EDIT2: Well, that's not the only difference obviously. The big one that makes a processor in order versus out of order is whether a stalled instruction causes all subsequent instructions in the stream to stall or just ones with data dependencies on it. But the problem of quashing bad instructions is shared by all processors that are pipelined and which can throw exceptions, not just those that continue speculatively issuing past predicted branches.
- nnx 9y agoAre Apple Ax processors affected? Could their great performance advantage over other ARM-based be derived from a similar “check later” speculation as Intel’s?