3 ms·
The core of this attack is extremely simple and elegant; use a value from a speculated-but-not-completed instruction as an index, causing one of a set of cachel
by userbinator 9y ago
The core of this attack is extremely simple and elegant; use a value from a speculated-but-not-completed instruction as an index, causing one of a set of cachelines to be touched; then use a timing measurement on those cachelines to see which one was accessed, thus determining the value.
This is a nightmare for the cloud, but IMHO for personal computing, it only furthers the notion that you should trust every bit of code running on your system, and my long-standing view that protection features like paging, rings, and access bits should really be considered more of barriers to prevent accidents than any real isolation. Timing-based sidechannels are notoriously difficult to excise completely.