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> OpenPGP at it's core is surprisingly simple standard A simple standard doesn't automatically give you an end-user product that is simple and that anyone want
by kelnos 9y ago
> OpenPGP at it's core is surprisingly simple standard
A simple standard doesn't automatically give you an end-user product that is simple and that anyone wants to use. GnuPG as a piece of software is ridiculously complicated and uses terms and concepts that the vast majority of people don't and won't understand.
Is it possible to make a simple experience from the OpenPGP spec, one that would be accessible to the majority of non-technical users, and could be seamlessly integrated into common communications workflows? I don't know, though I would suspect it's not.
- Shoothe 9y ago> A simple standard doesn't automatically give you an end-user product that is simple and that anyone wants to use. I never said it does. What Moxie claims is that decentralized standard (like OpenPGP) will always be worse than centralized, curated solution (like Signal). As for making OpenPGP easier to use check out OpenKeychain [0]. The developers have clear design guidelines to keep things simple. [0]: https://www.openkeychain.org/ https://www.openkeychain.org/ Another example of decentralized solution more in line of the current messanging topic: Conversations.im [1] - supports end-to-end encryption and you can set it up on your own server (uses XMPP). [1]: https://conversations.im/ https://conversations.im/
- thomastjeffery 9y ago> is ridiculously complicated and uses terms and concepts that the vast majority of people don't and won't understand. You are being a bit harsh. Sure, it's complicated if you don't understand the basics of public key encryption, but as soon as you do, GPG is trivial to use. The problem most people have is an unwillingness to learn the basic concepts. Public key encryption is a novel idea, and really isn't hard to learn.
- DanBC 9y ago> Sure, it's complicated if you don't understand the basics of public key encryption, but as soon as you do, GPG is trivial to use. Do you have any research to support your claims? Because everything I've seen says that PGP / GPG is hard to use, even for smart tech-literate people who have something to hide. These are all old. I don't know if it's got much better. http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/1998/abstracts/98-155.html http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/1998/abstracts/98... https://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html https://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Why_Johnny_Cant_Encrypt/OReilly.pdf https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Why_Johnny_Ca...
- thomastjeffery 9y ago> Do you have any research to support your claims? I thought it obvious from the language that I was sharing an anecdote.
- lmm 9y ago> Is it possible to make a simple experience from the OpenPGP spec, one that would be accessible to the majority of non-technical users, and could be seamlessly integrated into common communications workflows? I don't know, though I would suspect it's not. I suspect it would. Certainly it's not a possibility we should write off when no-one's seriously tried.
- kelnos 9y agoI think people have tried, and the only meaningful success has come from approaches that build key management into the mail client and make it transparent. At first blush this seems great, but there are drawbacks that make it not worth that much: 1) For a web-based client, the keypair is stored out of the user's control, so it ends up meaning you're outsourcing trust to a third party, not just that they're trustworthy, but that they'll never experience a breach. 2) For a local client, the keypair isn't backed up anywhere, so if the user switches computers or suffers a hardware failure, the key is gone. These days you can mitigate that issue by integrating a cloud backup feature, but then you're risking that the user is protecting the private key with a weak password (which I'd expect to be common). I expect that most people don't use thick clients these days, outside of corporate use that mandates Exchange/Outlook or something similar. 3) You don't get the benefits of the web of trust. These sorts of users will never go to a key-signing party or anything like that, so one of the stated goals of OpenPGP -- that you can examine that web to feel safe that you're actually communicating with whom you think you are -- just falls away.
- lmm 9y ago> I think people have tried, and the only meaningful success has come from approaches that build key management into the mail client and make it transparent. At first blush this seems great, but there are drawbacks that make it not worth that much: I'd say no-one has tried at the level of committing significant resources to it - i.e. a couple of full-time developers/designers. Certainly not the level of investment that Signal has got. > 2) For a local client, the keypair isn't backed up anywhere, so if the user switches computers or suffers a hardware failure, the key is gone. These days you can mitigate that issue by integrating a cloud backup feature, but then you're risking that the user is protecting the private key with a weak password (which I'd expect to be common). I expect that most people don't use thick clients these days, outside of corporate use that mandates Exchange/Outlook or something similar. All true. I'd hope that hardware tokens (Yubikey et al) could offer a solution, if we could agree on a standard for them. A good "web crypto" API would also be a huge help - browsers are more willing to add new APIs these days, so something like an encrypted input field where the cryptography is managed by the browser and the far side never sees the plaintext is a bit more feasible. Also the rise of bitcoin means people are having to get used to the level of key/passphrase security necessary for securing genuinely valuable things - we're seeing a new wave of interest in things like SSSS split keys. There are serious challenges, but there's room for hope as well. > 3) You don't get the benefits of the web of trust. These sorts of users will never go to a key-signing party or anything like that, so one of the stated goals of OpenPGP -- that you can examine that web to feel safe that you're actually communicating with whom you think you are -- just falls away. True, though there are also a lot more ways identities could be passed around these days. When Keybase started I dared to hope they'd help improve the OpenPGP ecosystem, though they seem to have gone down the opposite track now.