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Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics
- qubex 9y agoVery nice resource. (Applied mathematician that ended up in macroeconomics by way of differential and algorithmic game theory).
- decentralised 9y agoOut of curiosity, have you had the opportunity to look into cryptoeconomics? https://github.com/jpantunes/awesome-cryptoeconomics https://github.com/jpantunes/awesome-cryptoeconomics
- elbear 9y agoThe article says that no background in game theory is assumed. What kind of background is required though?
- ianai 9y agoThe abstract makes it sound not highly technical. You may be fine with just linear algebra and calculus 1. Edit- quote from the introduction: “The technical material includes logic, probability theory, game theory, and optimization.[...]the goal has been to gather the most important elements from each discipline and weave them together into a balanced and accurate introduction to this broad field. The intended reader is a graduate student or an advanced undergraduate, prototypically, but not necessarily, in computer science”
- elbear 9y agoThank you. One more reason to learn linear algebra and calculus then.
- lpage 9y agoFor those interested in the intersection of computer science and economics, I highly recommend the freely available Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations by Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown [1]. [1] http://www.masfoundations.org/mas.pdf http://www.masfoundations.org/mas.pdf
- vowelless 9y agoTheir game theory courses are pretty useful too.
- jvican 9y agoAny idea how I can get an ePub or MoBi version of this?
- gnicholas 9y agoThere's a free document converter available here: http://sensusaccess.com/convert-a-file http://sensusaccess.com/convert-a-file
- gowld 9y agoIf HTML is good enough: https://www.arxiv-vanity.com/ https://www.arxiv-vanity.com/ Arxiv Vanity renders academic papers from Arxiv as responsive web pages so you don’t have to squint at a PDF.
- Yen 9y agoThanks for the link, this will prove useful given the amount of Arxiv links on HN. Doesn't appear to work with this paper, though.
- bluetwo 9y agoUsing Rock-Paper-Scissors and an AI engine I stumbled across a bit of a flaw in the textbook answer around this game. The solution is not necessarily that both players will play all three options randomly. It is only necessary for ONE player to play randomly in order to reach an equilibrium. The other player at that point is free to pick any strategy they choose, including playing a single option 100% of the time.
- qubex 9y agoI’m pretty sure that’s incorrect. I haven’t had time to look through the text yet but it sounds like you’re confusing the one-shot equilibrium (1/3 probability of playing any one of the three available strategies), each deploying simultaneously, and the iterated game scenario (in which one player could be random, and you argue the other could continually play the same strategy repeatedly, but then the other player would latch on and play the matching countermove, pushing them both back towards randomness). EDIT: It’s not nice to vote people down just because they politely point out you’re demonstrably wrong.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- bluetwo 9y agoI haven't down voted anyone. Setup your own experiment and let me know what you find.
- nostromo95 9y agoYou’re mixing up equilibrium payoff and Nash Equilibrium (which is a strategy profile). Yes, the payoffs of player A randomizing and player B playing scissors is the same as both players randomizing, but observe that this profile of strategies fails the ex-post facto definition of Nash Equlibrium, i.e. in retrospect player A would want to change their strategy choice to “play rock every time.”
- qubex 9y agoThen I apologise for thinking it had been you. I’m going to sound very arrogant but: I don’t need to set up the scenario you describe because optimal strategies in identical games have been proven since the 1940s when Oskar Morgenstern and John Von Neumann published their seminal Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944). If you are getting results that are in conflict with that which is mathematically proven (provided certain circumstantial criteria are met), then you can be sure that you have not exactly matched the circumstantial criteria assumed as a perquisite for the proof. So basically you’re in another situation where the theorem makes no claim to hold and, unsurprisingly, doesn’t.