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For example, ALL subsidies are economically harmful. You are overstating your case. In a completely free market, public goods (goods which are non-rivalrous an
by yummyfajitas 16y ago
For example, ALL subsidies are economically harmful.
You are overstating your case. In a completely free market, public goods (goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludible) will be under provisioned, since people will have an incentive to freeload of the people who do pay. Subsidies for public goods, or even private goods with a positive external benefit can (if the level is chosen correctly) prevent this under provisioning.
Granted, parking (and owning a home) are private goods, so the point is moot for the purposes of this article and your example.
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]
- Retric 16y agoA true public good (non-rivalrous and non-excludible) would in effect need to be completely subsidized. The closest real world example would be pure research which in the real world is paid for by the government or non profit seeking organizations. IMO, GPL code is close, however it is somewhat rivalrous in that only a few branches will be maintained, and insuring code which best supports your organization is in the main branch has value. EX: Google does not want an add blocker to be installed in Firefox by default. However, that's not what is generally considered a subsidy. A targeted tax break on wind farms is the the class of activity I am talking about. When governments directly provide services there is little incentive to increase production beyond what is useful and significant incentive to cut back production. However, with farm (food) subsidies there is by definition overproduction which prevents non subsidized actors from competing and distorts consumption. PS: Thanks, I should have been more clear.
- eru 16y ago> A true public good (non-rivalrous and non-excludible) would in effect need to be completely subsidized. Not necessarily. Please see "The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance contracts" ( http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/PrivateProvision.pdf http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/PrivateProvision.pdf)
- Retric 16y agoWait, Assume that all agents are anti free-riders. Whether from moral prohibition or for some other reason none of these agents will ever knowingly free ride on another. Assume, however, that each agent is unaware that the others are anti free-riders. I am a free rider when possible so his logic falls apart. People make irrational choices all the time so charites are capable of gathering relativly small amounts of money (total from all of them is 2.2% GDP and there are a lot of such orginizations). However, there is a reason expencive things like building ITER are not based on cheritable donations.