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Then you might find that Thomas Hühn's approach helps you. * https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/ https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/ The "another cryp
by JdeBP 9y ago
Then you might find that Thomas Hühn's approach helps you.
* https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/ https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/
The "another crypto expert" mentioned by schoen is Daniel J. Bernstein, quoted directly by Hühn.
- schoen 9y agoIndeed, thanks! That was the other piece that I was thinking of and couldn't find right away.
- Bromskloss 9y agoI guess this kind of, maybe, explains it, though in an oblique way, and even that only because I was already on the lookout for something about information-theoretical security vs. computational security. It mostly brings up misconceptions I never had, and attacks those. For example, why would it matter that /dev/random gets its output from the same CSPRNG as /dev/urandom (or any other CSPRNG)? Shouldn't the output of the CSPRNG, assuming its state is large enough, contain as much entropy as its input? The focus on giving me orders about what I should do, rather than telling me why, also gets old somewhere around the first time.