I don't disagree with the statement, but it is still missing the point. This is still equating user features with fundamental operating system security choices

I don't disagree with the statement, but it is still missing the point. This is still equating user features with fundamental operating system security choices and presenting it as an either/or option. 1. They are two wildly different things. The Core Security design is not for you as a consumer of the device. It is for publishers and developers and Nintendo themselves to have trust in the system. What is being argued here is user features. Nice to have's (and I agree, REALLY nice to haves) but not MUST haves for the consoles success. Publishers aren't walking away from the switch in droves and game sales aren't endanger of being eroded because there isn't "Find my switch." 2. It's not a set in stone decision. The core security design has to be competent and hardened from Day 1. You're running against console homebrewers and hackers who will say things like "Stay on Firmware 3.0.0". Knowing full well that you will never be perfect, you have to be reasonably resistant to a webkit exploit that leads to code execution. The success of the security design is measured in days to code execution. The features that are being talked about in this particular thread can be added (and removed: see Sony and otheros without the legal argument) at any time they want. We (consumers) may very well get the user-conveinence features being talked about here.. someday. But the Switch's security model has been defeated as of Firmware 3.0.0 and it is unlikely that it'll ever fully recover. (If a 1st or 2nd stage bootloader exploit is discover, then s/unlikely/never.)