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Mathematical basis for Bitcoin still compromised by "rubber hose" cryptanalysis. Let this be a reminder that physical security is a necessary precursor to comp
by logfromblammo 9y ago
Mathematical basis for Bitcoin still compromised by "rubber hose" cryptanalysis.
Let this be a reminder that physical security is a necessary precursor to computer security. And I also hope that Exmo's succession plan executor takes the precaution of staying up late tonight to move all their reserves to new wallets.
- ImSkeptical 9y agoThat will be a brutal task, knowing that doing it ensures your colleague will get tortured and be unable to stop the torture by giving up the bitcoins. Still, probably for the best.
- monkmartinez 9y agoOr was it an inside job? Bitcoin is such bullshit garbage.
- ringaroundthetx 9y agoYeah hopefully assailants will also be educated in the futility of their actions If the whole idea of a kneecap-breaking plot fails because transferring the funds requires multiple signers then they arent going to break kneecaps
- ImSkeptical 9y agoAgreed, it would still be a tough task to complete.
- DennisP 9y agoExactly. For large amounts, keep the hardware wallet in a safe deposit box, not in your house.
- Klathmon 9y agoOr you can use the strengths of cryptocurrency and split a key between a safe deposit box, your home, and yourself, and require 2 of 3 of them to get the original key.
- frikk 9y agoThat's a neat idea. Do you mind expanding on it?
- solotronics 9y agoit's called 2 of 3 multisig and it's a standardized part of most cryotocurrency. it requires X of Y separate key signings to complete a transaction from an address
- MichaelGG 9y agoShamir's Secret Sharing allows this even without dealing with multisig wallets.
- Klathmon 9y agoThis is what I had in mind. And it can scale to any "n of m" you want, without any if the downsides if multisig wallets (namely larger transactions, and more complex Bitcoin wallets required) 2 of 2, 3 of 5, 7 of 10, etc...
- DennisP 9y agoI like the idea but I wish there were a widely-trusted implementation with public security reviews, maybe built into wallet software.
- Klathmon 9y agoIt's not a terribly large amount of code, and it's easy to test, even with a "live" key (since testing that any n of m can be recombined doesn't force a spend or reveal anything externally). Also, it's a fairly well-known system, so I don't see it being collectively "forgotten" on the timescale of a few decades (it's been around since the late 70's i believe). I'd love to get it integrated into wallet software, as it's such a safe and reliable way of storing secrets that lets you be as "secure" or as "reliable" as you want with just a slider.
- petre 9y agoA safe deposit box in Ukraine? You have to be kidding me. We are talking about a country where corruption is rife, at war with its separatist regions.
- nicky0 9y agoYou don't believe that Ukraine has safe deposit boxes?
- shokunin 9y agoUkraine is at war with Russia, which attacked it. Get the story straight.
- atomashpolskiy 9y agoIf Ukraine was attacked by Russia, why Ukraine's legitimate president is hiding in Russia then?
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- derefr 9y agoThe mathematical basis for multisig wallets is explicitly resistant to rubber-hose cryptanalysis, if the keys are distributed sensibly (e.g. with one going off to a counter party in a different political regime who can’t be compelled by the same state-actors as you to share keys.)
- cm2187 9y agoThe best way to not get your car stoken is to leave the engine in a warehouse in Germany, the chassis in a car park in Brazil and the rest in your garage in California. That's super secure but how do you use it every day?
- AgentME 9y agoAn exchange doesn't have to have all of their assets ready to use at a moment's notice. They could have 95% of their assets locked up in an inconvenient but safe method. If their hot wallet starts running low, then they begin the process to top it up with their hard-to-use multisig protected funds.
- decker 9y agoGood thing nobody can tell when the hot wallet starts to run low, otherwise they might know the exact moment when the keys need to come together.
- tehlike 9y agoFor bitcoin, they can actually tell. For things like monero, not really.
- AgentME 9y agoThe keys don't have to come together. Each keyholder can separately sign the transaction from wherever they are on the planet. The transaction to add funds into the hot wallet could have been pre-arranged. One of the keys could be controlled by a law office on the other side of the planet with contractual obligations to only sign the hot-wallet-refill transaction with a certain amount when the hot wallet falls below a certain amount and when the exchange requests it. The cold-wallet that they're funding from could itself be funded by a timelocked transaction to guarantee that the cold-wallet isn't emptied out too fast, and an entirely different set of law offices that the exchange doesn't regularly contact control the keys that allow the cold-wallet to be emptied out faster. If the different types of on-chain controls like timelocked transactions aren't enough, then some of the keys could be in tamper-proof hardware-security-modules that further restrict how the keys can be used.