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PQ crypto has to be secure against a scalable quantum computer i.e. one that can be increased to attack arbitrarily large keysizes. Building a quantum computer
by betterunix2 9y ago
PQ crypto has to be secure against a scalable quantum computer i.e. one that can be increased to attack arbitrarily large keysizes. Building a quantum computer with enough qbits to attack RSA2048 is not a problem if there is no known way to increase the number of qbits to attack RSA3072 -- but if you can keep adding more qbits, then we need a post-quantum algorithm.
The interest in post-quantum crypto is mainly in public-key systems, because for symmetric key systems you can essentially double the key size to achieve the same security level. In other words, AES256 is as secure against a quantum computer as AES128 is against a classical computer. On the other hand, quantum algorithms break RSA and DLOG (include ECDLOG), so the research has been on new approaches to public key crypto that seem hard for quantum computers. For example, the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_errors https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_errors
- yalogin 9y agoInteresting. But an ec 512 bit key has a theoretically same strength as an aes 256 bit key. How is aes able to withstand it when ec and rsa can’t?
- CiPHPerCoder 9y agoAES's security reduction in the quantum scenario comes from a sqrt(n) reduction in search time. It's an optimized brute force against the key. ECC gets broken because there is a quantum algorithm that solves the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem much faster than sqrt(n).
- yalogin 9y agoThanks. Looks like I have a wrong understanding of quantum computing. I thought QC increases the computing power by a lot there by making it easier or practical to compute the discrete log. So are you saying that the QC paradigm lends itself to a different class of algorithms?
- CiPHPerCoder 9y agoYes, look up Shor's Algorithm and Grover's Algorithm.