> What can an ordinary person do? Use non-x86 platforms such as an ARM based Chromebook, or potentially an x86 with the ME partially disabled (coreboot or simi

> What can an ordinary person do? Use non-x86 platforms such as an ARM based Chromebook, or potentially an x86 with the ME partially disabled (coreboot or similar, but it's not a 100% guarantee). > Plugging out the network cable? It depends on the vulnerability scope. If it's over HECI (virtual PCI device between host OS and ME) then removing the network cable won't save you from local malware owning the ME via HECI. > But then again the moment you plug internet back in you're done. Well considering how few people ever update the firmware of their devices, it's unlikely a majority of computers would ever be patched against an ME vulnerability anyway. Starting with ME12 Intel is going to start checking the ME firmware version number in the ME's silicon (read-only) boot ROM to prevent firmware downgrade attacks. [1] This version number is stored in single use eFuses which can only be incremented, and are during an ME update. But it depends on your threat model. As stated in the PDF, there are only 3 known exploits against the ME, and only one results in unsigned code execution. Until someone weaponizes such an exploit, which at the moment it seems physical access is needed, then Intel x86 owners are safe. If your adversary is a three letter agency or nation state attacker, then you've got bigger concerns than someone hacking your ME (starting with, say, your OS). [1] https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/111#issuecomment-350480591 https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/111#issuecomment-...