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Here's a spec which was buggy and yet widely accepted and implemented: TLS 1.0 You could formally prove an implementation of it and had a dangerously buggy end
by falcolas 9y ago
Here's a spec which was buggy and yet widely accepted and implemented: TLS 1.0
You could formally prove an implementation of it and had a dangerously buggy end product. The same could be said for many of the early encryption specs which have proven to be vulnerable against timing attacks, side channel attacks, and so forth.
I've helped QA quite a few financial specs (namely those created to transform credit reports into decisions) which were inherently buggy, and these were written as almost pure mathematical formulas that just didn't take corner cases into account.
A formal proof has value, but it's certainly not an absolute - relying on it blindly to indicate the correctness of a program is putting yourself at risk.
EDIT: As a completely separate point, let's look at the potential problems with this sorting spec: "the answer is ordered and has the same elements as the input array."
What does ordered mean? How do I compare a number and a string? A binary blob? A structure? Is there a restriction on the word "same" - do they have to be the existing object, or can it be a copy? Should the answer be in the same memory space as the original, or should it be a distinct memory object? Can the original be modified?
- user5994461 9y agoThat's joining the correctness/safety vs security argument. Correctness/safety is to do what it's supposed to do. Security is to do what it's supposed to do when there is an intelligent third party that is actively trying to prevent that.
- falcolas 9y agoTo that, I would argue that security is (or should be) part of the spec; if it’s not secure, it’s not correct. Having it be a separate and lesser concern is how we end up tacking on security features as an afterthought. To borrow from the kernel devs: Security requirements are just like any other requirements.
- wizeman 9y ago> A formal proof has value, but it's certainly not an absolute - relying on it blindly to indicate the correctness of a program is putting yourself at risk. Indeed, I agree, but lots of people never ask themselves how much more at risk they are putting themselves when their implementation has no formal spec or proof at all! Like another commenter has argued, it seems that people seem to look at formal verification like it's an all-or-nothing approach (either it achieves zero bugs or it's completely worthless, or alternatively -- if it's formally verified then it MUST be bug free!), but it's really not, it simply gives higher (often, much much higher) assurances.
- cmrx64 9y agoSee, once you have a spec, you have TWO jobs. Verification, showing that the spec and the impl agree. This is usually done with comprehensive tests if it's done at all, and very rarely with formal methods (since formal specs are so rare). TLS 1.0 is not a formal spec. Concurrently, you have validation. This is arguably far far more important, since it's cheaper to fix this before you go spend money on verification. Validation is showing that the spec, IS THE RIGHT SPEC! This is where you would have put almost all your cryptographers when developing TLS 1.0, and there's work on doing this with TLS 1.3 (eg, https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/infk/inst-infsec/information-security-group-dam/research/software/TLS-1.3_thesis_vincent_stettler.pdf https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/infk/i...). Once you have a formal spec, written in an automated, machine-checked system, you can start analyzing it with formal methods. This is super super powerful. The seL4 specification, even at its most abstract, is rather subtle and quite long. It's hard to reason with it. But since they already had a formal spec, they could analyze that spec at its highest level of abstraction to prove valuable security properties: confidentiality and integrity. Now, you don't have to look at the whole spec to validate it for your security requirements. You just have to look at the statements of confidentiality and integrity and validate those. This is standard high-assurance software development, and it's not taught or practice very often. >What does ordered mean? How do I compare a number and a string? A binary blob? A structure? Is there a restriction on the word "same" - do they have to be the existing object, or can it be a copy? Should the answer be in the same memory space as the original, or should it be a distinct memory object? Can the original be modified? this is completely uninteresting in any formal spec system, because it fixes those details usually implicitly. you're usually comparing things of the same type, or using an explicit comparison operator that has stated properties (which become proof obligations).