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I'm surprised people actually trust their browser encryption. All it takes to decrypt is for a government to ask for your ISP's reverse proxy logs or acquire a

I'm surprised people actually trust their browser encryption. All it takes to decrypt is for a government to ask for your ISP's reverse proxy logs or acquire a bunch of root certificates.

Benjamin_Dobell 9y ago
How are "reverse proxy logs" in any way useful for decrypting SSL? Root certificates aren't useful either unless users install them. On the other hand, private keys of SSL providers can be of use for serving false certificates, but that's only useful if you also MITM.
- turblety 9y ago
  The problem with root certificates is there are so many of them installed by default with your operating system. As of writing this message I currently have over 170 root certificates on my macOS. Some of them are from companies who are known to care very little about your privacy. There's even a "Federal Common Policy" certificate which is actually run by the US government [1] If the government did MITM you're traffic, it would still show in the certificate chain. But how many people really check this every time they visit a site? 1. https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174 https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174
  - willstrafach 9y ago
    1. It is a calculated risk to MitM this way, if someone notices the cert is different than what everyone else sees, there would be pretty major blowback. 2. Regardless, Certificate Transparency means it will almost certainly be noticed.
- kurthr 9y ago
  Which you can assume on some I flight Wi-Fi... https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-you-probably-shouldnt-be-doing-work-on-that-in-flight-wi-fi/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-y...
- nurettin 9y ago
  Reverse proxy is part of the MITM. Every sizeable work place in my country has some sort of root certificate installed on every workstation's browsers. They log your traffic and use those root certificates to decrypt your traffic. -1 all you want.
  - deleted 9y ago
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testestx 9y ago
That's why browsers pin the certificates of certain sites.
AgentME 9y ago
Most HTTPS connections use Forward Secrecy, so even if a government records an encrypted HTTPS connection and then later gets access to the private keys of the relevant TLS certificates, they still can't decrypt the recorded connection.
- stctgion 9y ago
  It's still possible for the government to apply pressure so that ISPs man in the middle and force weaker ciphers that can be decoded after the fact
  - willstrafach 9y ago
    They cannot force weaker ciphers. TLS specifically won’t allow it due to past attacks relying on this.
  - AgentME 9y ago
    Everyone would notice if ISPs were man-in-the-middling their TLS connections because none of the TLS connections would work.
pgo 9y ago
You don't understand the web's chain of trust.

I'm surprised people actually trust their browser encryption. All it takes to decrypt is for a government to ask for your ISP's reverse proxy logs or acquire a bunch of root certificates.

Benjamin_Dobell 9y ago

How are "reverse proxy logs" in any way useful for decrypting SSL? Root certificates aren't useful either unless users install them. On the other hand, private keys of SSL providers can be of use for serving false certificates, but that's only useful if you also MITM.

turblety 9y ago
The problem with root certificates is there are so many of them installed by default with your operating system. As of writing this message I currently have over 170 root certificates on my macOS. Some of them are from companies who are known to care very little about your privacy. There's even a "Federal Common Policy" certificate which is actually run by the US government [1] If the government did MITM you're traffic, it would still show in the certificate chain. But how many people really check this every time they visit a site? 1. https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174 https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174
- willstrafach 9y ago
  1. It is a calculated risk to MitM this way, if someone notices the cert is different than what everyone else sees, there would be pretty major blowback. 2. Regardless, Certificate Transparency means it will almost certainly be noticed.
kurthr 9y ago
Which you can assume on some I flight Wi-Fi... https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-you-probably-shouldnt-be-doing-work-on-that-in-flight-wi-fi/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-y...
nurettin 9y ago
Reverse proxy is part of the MITM. Every sizeable work place in my country has some sort of root certificate installed on every workstation's browsers. They log your traffic and use those root certificates to decrypt your traffic. -1 all you want.
- deleted 9y ago
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- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]

testestx 9y ago

That's why browsers pin the certificates of certain sites.

AgentME 9y ago

Most HTTPS connections use Forward Secrecy, so even if a government records an encrypted HTTPS connection and then later gets access to the private keys of the relevant TLS certificates, they still can't decrypt the recorded connection.

stctgion 9y ago
It's still possible for the government to apply pressure so that ISPs man in the middle and force weaker ciphers that can be decoded after the fact
- willstrafach 9y ago
  They cannot force weaker ciphers. TLS specifically won’t allow it due to past attacks relying on this.
- AgentME 9y ago
  Everyone would notice if ISPs were man-in-the-middling their TLS connections because none of the TLS connections would work.

pgo 9y ago

You don't understand the web's chain of trust.