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Yeah, and mind you the UK under May and the US would almost certainly love to do this too. Demonize encryption and anything which might allow you to bypass eith
by QAPereo 9y ago
Yeah, and mind you the UK under May and the US would almost certainly love to do this too. Demonize encryption and anything which might allow you to bypass either monitoring, ISP fuckery, or copyright law. There’s probably no technical solution for a government to do this, but as with rubber hose crypto, they don’t actually need one. If we don’t want this in our future, it’s going to take a lot of work.
- nurettin 9y agoI'm surprised people actually trust their browser encryption. All it takes to decrypt is for a government to ask for your ISP's reverse proxy logs or acquire a bunch of root certificates.
- Benjamin_Dobell 9y agoHow are "reverse proxy logs" in any way useful for decrypting SSL? Root certificates aren't useful either unless users install them. On the other hand, private keys of SSL providers can be of use for serving false certificates, but that's only useful if you also MITM.
- turblety 9y agoThe problem with root certificates is there are so many of them installed by default with your operating system. As of writing this message I currently have over 170 root certificates on my macOS. Some of them are from companies who are known to care very little about your privacy. There's even a "Federal Common Policy" certificate which is actually run by the US government [1] If the government did MITM you're traffic, it would still show in the certificate chain. But how many people really check this every time they visit a site? 1. https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174 https://security.stackexchange.com/a/71174
- willstrafach 9y ago1. It is a calculated risk to MitM this way, if someone notices the cert is different than what everyone else sees, there would be pretty major blowback. 2. Regardless, Certificate Transparency means it will almost certainly be noticed.
- kurthr 9y agoWhich you can assume on some I flight Wi-Fi... https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-you-probably-shouldnt-be-doing-work-on-that-in-flight-wi-fi/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/02/why-y...
- nurettin 9y agoReverse proxy is part of the MITM. Every sizeable work place in my country has some sort of root certificate installed on every workstation's browsers. They log your traffic and use those root certificates to decrypt your traffic. -1 all you want.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- testestx 9y agoThat's why browsers pin the certificates of certain sites.
- AgentME 9y agoMost HTTPS connections use Forward Secrecy, so even if a government records an encrypted HTTPS connection and then later gets access to the private keys of the relevant TLS certificates, they still can't decrypt the recorded connection.
- stctgion 9y agoIt's still possible for the government to apply pressure so that ISPs man in the middle and force weaker ciphers that can be decoded after the fact
- willstrafach 9y agoThey cannot force weaker ciphers. TLS specifically won’t allow it due to past attacks relying on this.
- AgentME 9y agoEveryone would notice if ISPs were man-in-the-middling their TLS connections because none of the TLS connections would work.
- pgo 9y agoYou don't understand the web's chain of trust.
- confounded 9y agoWe need to provide a united voice. And that is probably via some kind of organization outside of our respective monopolistic corporations.