6 ms·

Surely I'm reading this wrong. Does the whole thing depend on users trusting that the nodes run the correct software, which uses these "enclaves" to hide privat

• wmf 9y ago
  The nodes can prove that they are running the correct software using SGX.
  • kbwt 9y ago
    If you trust Intel. In that case, why not use a centralized ledger operated by Intel? It would certainly be more efficient, and no less trust-worthy. You even eliminate a whole bunch of side-channel attack vectors on the MobileCoin software such as memory access patterns, heat dissipation patterns, timing analysis, and failure modes such as total compromise of SGX.
    • orblivion 9y ago
      Well it's a little different in that in your scenario Intel would be able to decide after the fact to do something bad.
      • kbwt 9y ago
        Intel can at any time decide to publish false SGX attestations. You won't know until it's too late.
  • orblivion 9y ago
    I'm not sure what this means. Supposing I'm a node that runs the correct software as well as some incorrect software. I prove (however this works) using SGX that I'm running the correct software. You send me the data and I run it through the incorrect software. I imagine my ignorance of SGX has something to do with this. Is there a 101 link somewhere?
    • betterunix2 9y ago
      One approach: use attestation to prove that a public key was created inside an SGX "enclave". Encrypt the inputs using the public key, and now only the enclave can decrypt and use the inputs.
    • mike_hearn 9y ago
      As betterunix says, the way you do it is that the signed data structure proving what software you're running can contain a public key, for which the private key exists only in the enclave. So you can then encrypt secrets that are readable only in the enclave.