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The fiasco that was the appointment of the acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the absurd ping-pong policies of the Federal L
by wahern 9y ago
The fiasco that was the appointment of the acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the absurd ping-pong policies of the Federal Labor Bureau (FLB), FCC, and (presumably) the CFPB exemplify why in the United States civil suits are the better enforcement mechanism, especially in the modern era. They typically lead to more stable regulatory policies.
Heck, even the behavior of zoning boards exemplifies this. The civil actions are being used by YIMBYs precisely because the regulators--the zoning board--are neither obeying the spirit nor letter of the law, having become puppets of the elected officials or worse--wagging the dog.
A system of centralized regulators only works when you have a strong and independent technocratic bureaucracy. Because of the extreme divisiveness of modern politics, especially at the federal level where regulatory agencies have become turf for epic policy battles, that simply doesn't exist in the U.S. Indeed, the use of civil actions for enforcement is often chosen precisely to try to deflect criticism aimed at proponents of a regulatory framework, and protect the framework from interference by opponents. This is common at both the federal and state levels, and used by both parties.
Sure, civil actions are more costly. But much like democracy you pay a price for a certain amount of stability. Because of the size, diversity, and peculiar politics of the U.S., we often must resort to such approaches where, e.g., Norway, Japan or the EU would not.
- azernik 9y agoYou create a centralized bureaucracy by hiring bureaucrats and giving them the final say. The ping-pong policies of the FCC, FLB, and shortly the CFPB result from legislatures insisting on a system where political appointees are the ones who make the final vote on regulatory decisions. This results in a situation like the current FCC, where votes are party-line and regulatory action depends not on the written policies but on who won the most recent election. Similarly with zoning boards and the YIMBY suits - local zoning policies were made by elected city councils, and the YIMBY suits and state legislation are trying to force cities to pass legislation and then apply those rules without political interference.
- wahern 9y ago> You create a centralized bureaucracy by hiring bureaucrats and giving them the final say. Americans don't like doing that, especially conservative Americans for whom "centralized bureaucracy" is literally synonymous with Communism. In many states even judges and sheriffs are elected. My point is, if you want to shield the regulation from politics your best bet (although by no means guaranteed) is a framework that creates a private right of action. > Similarly with zoning boards and the YIMBY suits If zoning boards mechanically applied zoning ordinances like they're supposed to, things wouldn't be nearly as problematic as they are now. Ask any developer; they'd be thrilled if they only had to contend with the letter of the zoning ordinances. FWIW, in the business world private rights of action are usually preferred over a centralized regulator, at least if they have to choose their poison. Centralized regulators usually _prohibit_ certain business practices prophylactically long before any substantial harm arises. Whereas with private rights of action you get to do whatever you want, whenever you want, until you _actually_ harm someone. Historically this is one reason why some economists argue the United States and other Common Law jurisdictions that relied on civil actions were more innovative. Similarly, such jurisdictions were long considered more business friendly as regulatory policies were more predictable. A central regulator can decide to block your business on a whim, whereas with a civil action there has to be _actual_ harm as well as refusal to settle damages outside of court. Both can involve a lot of red tape and a long paper trail. The important distinctions are 1) whether the government steps in before or after substantial harm has occurred, and 2) how closely penalties reflect actual harm. Moreover, the basic issue is how reliably you can price risk into your business plan. A business can reasonably plan expenses for civil suits. A regulator can shut you down, and all the money in the world won't stop it. But other Common Law jurisdictions have slowly shifted enforcement to Continental-style centralized regulators. The U.S. has too, but it's been more chaotic, inconsistent, and (predictably) much more corrupted by politics. There are many reasons for this, but in any event there's no reason to think that Americans can do centralized bureaucracy any better than we do now. It's important to recognize and accept built-in political and societal constraints when engineering regulatory frameworks if you want to maximum benefit and minimize harm.
- azernik 9y ago> The U.S. has too, but it's been more chaotic, inconsistent, and (predictably) much more corrupted by politics. There are many reasons for this, but in any event there's no reason to think that Americans can do centralized bureaucracy any better than we do now. Agreed. Hence my original "because the US is crazy".