> My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails. Except that your example was just an equivocation of no substantial relevance to t

> My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails. Except that your example was just an equivocation of no substantial relevance to the problem at hand that also doesn't really hold? First of all, you should be well aware that we were talking about knowledge about external reality, so it's simply irrelevant that you can define knowledge to encompass awareness of individual personal experiences ... yes, you can, but that wasn't the topic of the discussion, and isn't contested by anyone, and thus doesn't contribute anything to the discussion. Secondly, I hope very much that you were not implying that you can know that what you experience as the cause of pain is in fact the cause, because that is contradicted by phantom pain, which requires scientific inquiry to (a) know about in general and (b) distinguish from pain caused by what you experience it to be caused by in the specific instance. Which is also the only way we know pain is even a common thing amongst people, as well as the reason we know what causes pain in many instances. And then, well, really, to an extent we can actually observe both causes for pain and whether someone is experiencing pain without the need to rely on self-reports, so the gap between what is purely subjective about the experience of pain and what can be observed about it scientifically is not as massive as you seem to suggest.