4 ms·
> Yes, so you disagree with the prior commenter. Possibly. > You think science is the "validator" of knowledge. Where did you get that from? > "I know that
by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago
> Yes, so you disagree with the prior commenter.
Possibly.
> You think science is the "validator" of knowledge.
Where did you get that from?
> "I know that I am in pain" is not validated by science, and science has no role even to play in "validating" it.
What is your justification for considering that an instance of cultural knowledge?
> "I know that science works" is not validated by science and science has no role in validating it.
So, how do you know that science works? Or are you saying that it doesn't work or that you don't know whether it works?
> It would seem there are probably knowledge claims which belong in the domain of culture that are likewise orthogonal to science
It would seem that something seeming to you to be the case is not a particularly convincing argument.
> ("I know that we liked the new Star Wars").
Are you saying this claim is not derived from empirical observation of "we" and/or not accessible to falsification (like, you think it is impossible to ask a representative sample of "we" whether they like Star Wars)? If that is what you mean, how do you know it, then? If that is not what you mean, how is that application of the scientific method orthogonal to science?
- mjburgess 9y ago> but what establishes validity is science/the scientific method My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails. > seeming to you to be the case That isn't my argument. My argument is inductive over the prior examples.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago> My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails. Except that your example was just an equivocation of no substantial relevance to the problem at hand that also doesn't really hold? First of all, you should be well aware that we were talking about knowledge about external reality, so it's simply irrelevant that you can define knowledge to encompass awareness of individual personal experiences ... yes, you can, but that wasn't the topic of the discussion, and isn't contested by anyone, and thus doesn't contribute anything to the discussion. Secondly, I hope very much that you were not implying that you can know that what you experience as the cause of pain is in fact the cause, because that is contradicted by phantom pain, which requires scientific inquiry to (a) know about in general and (b) distinguish from pain caused by what you experience it to be caused by in the specific instance. Which is also the only way we know pain is even a common thing amongst people, as well as the reason we know what causes pain in many instances. And then, well, really, to an extent we can actually observe both causes for pain and whether someone is experiencing pain without the need to rely on self-reports, so the gap between what is purely subjective about the experience of pain and what can be observed about it scientifically is not as massive as you seem to suggest.
- mjburgess 9y agoSo, if you restrict the domain of inquiry to the things that science best studies (causes and their origins) then science is the best to study it. The point was that there are other domains.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago> So, if you restrict the domain of inquiry to the things that science best studies (causes and their origins) then science is the best to study it. I didn't restrict anything, I just pointed out that your analogy is irrelevant to the topic at hand. The topic of the discussion was what methods can be used to reliably obtain knowledge about the external world, and being aware of individual personal experience just isn't. > The point was that there are other domains. OK, so what other domains of knowledge about the external world are there?
- ZenoArrow 9y ago> "OK, so what other domains of knowledge about the external world are there?" How do you think we acquired knowledge before the scientific method was devised?