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Biologists hypothesize that Mantis shrimps perceive 12 primary colors. Do you expect a sea creature the size of my fist to share art and literature about its in

Biologists hypothesize that Mantis shrimps perceive 12 primary colors. Do you expect a sea creature the size of my fist to share art and literature about its inner experience?

iainmerrick 9y ago
A biologist can explain the workings of the mantis's vision system, an artist can imagine what it might be like to be experience it. What does the philosopher contribute? (I'm not asserting there's no contribution, I'd just like someone to explain what it is.)
- Double_Cast 9y ago
  The scientist, artist, and philosopher have contributed jack squat. Actually, that's wrong. The scientist has contributed the appearance of knowledge where none exists. I.e. a delusion. The delusion is that modern science understands color. It indeed understands optics, but not color. The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Both are uncharted territory. Maybe one day we'll have a half-decent theory of color. When that day comes, it will probably bud-off and begin a field of study distinct from "philosophy proper". Just like math and science budded-off. In the meantime, the only thing we can do is imagine and philosophize. Because we don't understand how to even investigate the problem, let alone solve it. We're still at the stage analogous to when the Ancient Greeks were debating whether matter is continuous or discrete. "Nobody knows for sure, but matter sure feels continuous to me." The least we can do is demarcate our ignorance. Which is why blogposts like this exist. So when you (essentially) say "Our current theory of optics sounds perfectly satisfactory", you are defending the delusion the blogpost meant to correct. My two previous comments aren't meant to contribute a theory of color, but to make obvious that optics and color are not the same thing.
  - iainmerrick 9y ago
    The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. That's a good summary of what the article seems to be saying. But I still don't understand the reasoning behind that claim. I mean, from the article: But can this really be right? Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears. Yes, obviously? What's the problem? Somewhat analogously, there's a whole world of scent and pheromones that most animals perceive strongly, but we barely perceive at all. An entire sense that we don't even realise we're missing! I think that's fascinating, but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
    - Double_Cast 9y ago
      Philosophy divides the mystery of consciousness into two problems. The Soft Problem is "how does the brain compute things?". The Hard Problem is "how does qualia exist?". The Soft Problem is easy to imagine. Neuroscience will solve it eventually. We may not understand it yet, but we can make a lot of computer analogies and educated guesses. After all, computers are already Philosophical Zombies (someone who passes the Turing Test, yet in no way experiences qualia). > but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it? Here's the contention the professionals are currently debating. The Hard Problem challenges our notions of Physicalism (as opposed to say, Dualism). "But souls are dumb, Science says so!". Extrapolate into the future. Even after Neuroscience solves the brain's circuitry, qualia will remain just as mysterious as ever. E.g. suppose we discover that the hippocampus demultiplexes memories to different parts of the brain. Suppose we learn how to directly manipulate memory. Not only can we fix amnesia, but we can implant false memories. "Hooray, we've solved the Soft Problem!". But we still have no leads on the Hard Problem. A hippocampus doesn't distinguish a Homunculus from a P-Zombie. Physicalism has been so successful in the sciences, everyone takes its accuracy for granted. I myself consider Physicalism true. But Physicalism is not adequate to explain the Hard Problem. This doesn't mean we have to go back to souls. But it does mean we need to (at least) "spice up" Physicalism, or maybe choose another line of attack, etc if we're ever to crack the Hard Problem.
      - iainmerrick 9y ago
        It seems to me that philosophy has made zero progress on the hard problem, other than naming it. Is there any concrete progress, any useful result you can point me at? Neuroscience and computer science obviously haven't solved it either, but they have at least made some progress in understanding parts of the brain's structure, and gradually reproducing what we thought were uniquely human abilities with mindless computer programs. This suggests that "qualia" may not really be needed to explain consciousness (or at any rate thought); just as Darwin's theories showed why "god" isn't strictly needed to explain the diversity of animal species. I agree there's still the niggling issue of "but why do I seem to experience stuff? Surely I'm not a mindless automaton!" There's also the problem of "but why does the universe exist in the first place?" But I don't believe philosophers have any particular insight or knowledge to bring to the first problem, any more than theologians have any real inside knowledge of the latter.

Biologists hypothesize that Mantis shrimps perceive 12 primary colors. Do you expect a sea creature the size of my fist to share art and literature about its inner experience?

iainmerrick 9y ago

A biologist can explain the workings of the mantis's vision system, an artist can imagine what it might be like to be experience it. What does the philosopher contribute? (I'm not asserting there's no contribution, I'd just like someone to explain what it is.)

Double_Cast 9y ago
The scientist, artist, and philosopher have contributed jack squat. Actually, that's wrong. The scientist has contributed the appearance of knowledge where none exists. I.e. a delusion. The delusion is that modern science understands color. It indeed understands optics, but not color. The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Both are uncharted territory. Maybe one day we'll have a half-decent theory of color. When that day comes, it will probably bud-off and begin a field of study distinct from "philosophy proper". Just like math and science budded-off. In the meantime, the only thing we can do is imagine and philosophize. Because we don't understand how to even investigate the problem, let alone solve it. We're still at the stage analogous to when the Ancient Greeks were debating whether matter is continuous or discrete. "Nobody knows for sure, but matter sure feels continuous to me." The least we can do is demarcate our ignorance. Which is why blogposts like this exist. So when you (essentially) say "Our current theory of optics sounds perfectly satisfactory", you are defending the delusion the blogpost meant to correct. My two previous comments aren't meant to contribute a theory of color, but to make obvious that optics and color are not the same thing.
- iainmerrick 9y ago
  The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. That's a good summary of what the article seems to be saying. But I still don't understand the reasoning behind that claim. I mean, from the article: But can this really be right? Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears. Yes, obviously? What's the problem? Somewhat analogously, there's a whole world of scent and pheromones that most animals perceive strongly, but we barely perceive at all. An entire sense that we don't even realise we're missing! I think that's fascinating, but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
  - Double_Cast 9y ago
    Philosophy divides the mystery of consciousness into two problems. The Soft Problem is "how does the brain compute things?". The Hard Problem is "how does qualia exist?". The Soft Problem is easy to imagine. Neuroscience will solve it eventually. We may not understand it yet, but we can make a lot of computer analogies and educated guesses. After all, computers are already Philosophical Zombies (someone who passes the Turing Test, yet in no way experiences qualia). > but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it? Here's the contention the professionals are currently debating. The Hard Problem challenges our notions of Physicalism (as opposed to say, Dualism). "But souls are dumb, Science says so!". Extrapolate into the future. Even after Neuroscience solves the brain's circuitry, qualia will remain just as mysterious as ever. E.g. suppose we discover that the hippocampus demultiplexes memories to different parts of the brain. Suppose we learn how to directly manipulate memory. Not only can we fix amnesia, but we can implant false memories. "Hooray, we've solved the Soft Problem!". But we still have no leads on the Hard Problem. A hippocampus doesn't distinguish a Homunculus from a P-Zombie. Physicalism has been so successful in the sciences, everyone takes its accuracy for granted. I myself consider Physicalism true. But Physicalism is not adequate to explain the Hard Problem. This doesn't mean we have to go back to souls. But it does mean we need to (at least) "spice up" Physicalism, or maybe choose another line of attack, etc if we're ever to crack the Hard Problem.
    - iainmerrick 9y ago
      It seems to me that philosophy has made zero progress on the hard problem, other than naming it. Is there any concrete progress, any useful result you can point me at? Neuroscience and computer science obviously haven't solved it either, but they have at least made some progress in understanding parts of the brain's structure, and gradually reproducing what we thought were uniquely human abilities with mindless computer programs. This suggests that "qualia" may not really be needed to explain consciousness (or at any rate thought); just as Darwin's theories showed why "god" isn't strictly needed to explain the diversity of animal species. I agree there's still the niggling issue of "but why do I seem to experience stuff? Surely I'm not a mindless automaton!" There's also the problem of "but why does the universe exist in the first place?" But I don't believe philosophers have any particular insight or knowledge to bring to the first problem, any more than theologians have any real inside knowledge of the latter.