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So more specifically, HTTPS on pages where you log in is important, not necessarily on your landing / homepage? I am not disputing that may be a good idea, but

So more specifically, HTTPS on pages where you log in is important, not necessarily on your landing / homepage? I am not disputing that may be a good idea, but it seems like the main complaint is that users are submitting credentials on an HTTP page?

i80and 9y ago
This is exactly the opposite of what the article states. The HTTP landing page serves a link to the login page. This link could be modified by a hostile network to another site. The fact that the login page is served over HTTPS is immaterial for this attack.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- pmelendez 9y ago
  Honest question... Under that attack, wouldn't be the same whether you are using https or not? If you are in a hostile network with a compromised DNS, Couldn't the domain be phished too? Meaning that a valid certificate trusted by a fake CA would be used by the browser?
  - wayfarer2s 9y ago
    > valid certificate trusted by a fake CA I don't think that's possible. A fake CA can't issue out valid certificates because you wouldn't trust their certs to begin with -- it's all about trust and if you know they are a fake CA, then you would never trust them or anything they issue. It's like if a known counterfeiter claims to be selling legit products, you probably wouldn't trust them.
    - ashelmire 9y ago
      A compromised, but legitimate CA is a vector of attack in this case. Any CA can be compromised by nation-states through legal coercion, and all of them probably have some vulnerabilities that have yet to be found. There are also new CAs that are not yet trusted, and sometimes old ones that are on their way to being delisted. So you need an up-to-date list of trusted CAs (which most of us are relying on google for, in this case), which means trusting google at the very least (a company that compiles and sells your data, and is also based in a nation that issues secret warrants and orders to tech companies). It would be pretty surprising if this wasn't already a vector of attack being actively used (the fact that a trusted list needs to be maintained suggests that it is).
      - PeterisP 9y ago
        While there are ways to compromise CA's (e.g. like you say, by nation-states for their intelligence goals), it is important to think about the appropriate risk profile. For a NatWest customer accessing their internetbank, the expected, quite frequently observed risk comes from organized phishing teams pulling off mass semi-automated scams. For an attacker that, getting a certificate signed by a fake CA is unrealistic, and the concerns that you list aren't going to change anything since they're not going to do that anyway. On the other hand, getting a misleading certificate signed by a real CA and passing it off as the real thing is entirely feasible by this type of attacker, so fixing that is important. Nation-state hacking, censorship and advanced persistent threats aren't what's causing the most damage/problems to most people on the internet right now, the multitude of random criminals is the largest issue. If you have to worry about a CA "compromised by nation-states through legal coercion", then this by itself means that you have a very different risk profile than pretty much everyone else; and the risk-reducing activities that make sense for you shouldn't be expected to be relevant for others and vice versa.
      - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago
        Which is why certrificate transparency is coming, so those will be distrusted ASAP.
  - corford 9y ago
    The browser would still need to trust the fake CA, which means pwning the victim's computer i.e. it's already game over at that point.
  - anowlcalledjosh 9y ago
    > valid certificate > fake CA Pick one. If your cert isn't signed by a CA that the browser trusts, it won't load the page.
  - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago
    No, the whole point of TLS is that you don't have to trust the network. At all.
adamson 9y ago
Nope, you can MITM the HTTP-only landing page so the link to the login page takes you to a page that looks just like the actual banks login page, but actually just submits your credentials to an attacker. Modifying the link would not be possible if the landing page were served over an encrypted connection.
choward 9y ago
Not to be a dick, but did you even read the article? Is the video what confused you? He's showing that he changed the homepage to link to a login page that he controlled.

i80and 9y ago

This is exactly the opposite of what the article states. The HTTP landing page serves a link to the login page. This link could be modified by a hostile network to another site. The fact that the login page is served over HTTPS is immaterial for this attack.

deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
pmelendez 9y ago
Honest question... Under that attack, wouldn't be the same whether you are using https or not? If you are in a hostile network with a compromised DNS, Couldn't the domain be phished too? Meaning that a valid certificate trusted by a fake CA would be used by the browser?
- wayfarer2s 9y ago
  > valid certificate trusted by a fake CA I don't think that's possible. A fake CA can't issue out valid certificates because you wouldn't trust their certs to begin with -- it's all about trust and if you know they are a fake CA, then you would never trust them or anything they issue. It's like if a known counterfeiter claims to be selling legit products, you probably wouldn't trust them.
  - ashelmire 9y ago
    A compromised, but legitimate CA is a vector of attack in this case. Any CA can be compromised by nation-states through legal coercion, and all of them probably have some vulnerabilities that have yet to be found. There are also new CAs that are not yet trusted, and sometimes old ones that are on their way to being delisted. So you need an up-to-date list of trusted CAs (which most of us are relying on google for, in this case), which means trusting google at the very least (a company that compiles and sells your data, and is also based in a nation that issues secret warrants and orders to tech companies). It would be pretty surprising if this wasn't already a vector of attack being actively used (the fact that a trusted list needs to be maintained suggests that it is).
    - PeterisP 9y ago
      While there are ways to compromise CA's (e.g. like you say, by nation-states for their intelligence goals), it is important to think about the appropriate risk profile. For a NatWest customer accessing their internetbank, the expected, quite frequently observed risk comes from organized phishing teams pulling off mass semi-automated scams. For an attacker that, getting a certificate signed by a fake CA is unrealistic, and the concerns that you list aren't going to change anything since they're not going to do that anyway. On the other hand, getting a misleading certificate signed by a real CA and passing it off as the real thing is entirely feasible by this type of attacker, so fixing that is important. Nation-state hacking, censorship and advanced persistent threats aren't what's causing the most damage/problems to most people on the internet right now, the multitude of random criminals is the largest issue. If you have to worry about a CA "compromised by nation-states through legal coercion", then this by itself means that you have a very different risk profile than pretty much everyone else; and the risk-reducing activities that make sense for you shouldn't be expected to be relevant for others and vice versa.
    - zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago
      Which is why certrificate transparency is coming, so those will be distrusted ASAP.
- corford 9y ago
  The browser would still need to trust the fake CA, which means pwning the victim's computer i.e. it's already game over at that point.
- anowlcalledjosh 9y ago
  > valid certificate > fake CA Pick one. If your cert isn't signed by a CA that the browser trusts, it won't load the page.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 9y ago
  No, the whole point of TLS is that you don't have to trust the network. At all.

adamson 9y ago

Nope, you can MITM the HTTP-only landing page so the link to the login page takes you to a page that looks just like the actual banks login page, but actually just submits your credentials to an attacker. Modifying the link would not be possible if the landing page were served over an encrypted connection.

choward 9y ago

Not to be a dick, but did you even read the article? Is the video what confused you? He's showing that he changed the homepage to link to a login page that he controlled.