A couple points. First, I did not claim that the experience of things or even consciousness require appeals to anything immaterial or non-physical. I merely sai

A couple points. First, I did not claim that the experience of things or even consciousness require appeals to anything immaterial or non-physical. I merely said that a Cartesian materialism as a metaphysical position cannot explain these things, and this appears to be the way that many contemporary philosophers and physicists _in_their_philosophical_moments_ understand matter. Modern physics actually departs quite a bit from that kind of materialism. This is not a question first and foremost about the experience of color but the nature of color. Cartesians reduce color to an experience and locate that experience in an immaterial mind. Materialism, without reforming the account of matter inherited by Descartes, does away with the material mind and is now left with a desiccated account of reality that cannot even _in_principle_ account for color understood as experience. The solution is not to return to Cartesian dualism but to embrace a different metaphysics that can account for things like color, not as experiences, but as real properties of the world. After that, it is possible to talk about what it means to perceive color. (Indeed, a fatal flaw of modern philosophy is that it prioritizes epistemology over metaphysics, but that’s a topic for another day.) Second -- and this is not the main thrust of what I said, but it is in response to what you wrote -- you are begging the question when you presume that everything can be accounted for physics. Consider the concept of Triangularity. In the world, we have concrete, triangular things that instantiate Triangularity. We perceive them through our senses. One triangle may be an isosceles triangle, another might be equilateral, still another may be a right triangle. Of these, each may be large, small, drawn with thick lines or quickly sketched on the board with a piece of chalk. However, none of these triangular things are themselves Triangularity or else only one triangle could exist. Furthermore, none of these concrete instances are perfect instantiations of Triangularity. The lines composing them are never fully straight. They are only approximations, and yet we still know what Triangularity is, its properties (like the angles summing to 180 degrees), and so on. It exists in our minds, and in the mind it exists, by necessity, completely apart from any particular, concrete instantiations of it (we may have images of triangles in mind, but the images themselves are not Triangularity itself, something all these images share). It follows that because Triangularity isn’t concrete or particular, there exists in the mind something that isn’t concrete or particular, but universal. But because physical things are necessarily instantiations of universals and not universals themselves, then we have in our minds something non-physical.