There's a difference between refusing to serve someone because of race, gender or sexual preference (none of which is a choice, and none of which causes harm to

There's a difference between refusing to serve someone because of race, gender or sexual preference (none of which is a choice, and none of which causes harm to others) or religion (which is a choice but does not by definition cause harm to others though some religiously motivated actions may) vs refusing to serve someone because they actively advocate harming other people, which for one thing is a choice and for another is (duh) harmful. This false equivalency around Nazis and free speech makes me vomit. If they could, the advocates of this extreme free speech position would force a descendant of holocaust survivors to host speech by people who actively advocate killing him or her. It is only the government that has an obligation to censor no speech whatsoever (and even that obligation has limits when such speech leads to physical harm - the "'fire!' in a crowded theater" standard). Private entities have no such legal obligation. And just as your right to swing your fist ends where my face begins, my moral obligation to broadcast someone else's speech ends where the threats or advocacy to harm people I care about (physically or even by boycotting, or reducing their civil rights and liberties) begin. Edited to add: And in this category, I include (non-exhaustive list by any means)... slander/libel ("Jews eat babies!", "The gays are all child molesters!") - which is on its own harmful. Intention to intimidate ("Let's march through the minority neighborhood in white hoods", "Let's bring our firearms to Charlottesville and show them who's in charge") - which causes harm by interfering with people's right to go about their business free of fear and intimidation as long as they're not attacking anyone else. I think there's an argument to be made that nobody has a moral obligation to provide a platform for any speech they disagree with. Whether or not you agree with that, I'd consider the above standard (threats/advocacy of harm, broadly construed) highly defensible.