3 ms·
Yes, and, to be fair, it's been a known problem for years. There are some potential solutions in the works but you can't just pick an arbitrary day and flip a s
by jlgaddis 9y ago
Yes, and, to be fair, it's been a known problem for years. There are some potential solutions in the works but you can't just pick an arbitrary day and flip a switch and turn it on.
Most of these incidents are accidental and could easily be prevented. The network operator community can't even get everyone to implement BCP38, though, so something like a full Internet-wide RPKI is a pipe dream. Even basic filtering would prevent much of this but that's apparently asking too much as well.
The amount of filtering, if any, varies tremendously from network to network. Some won't accept routes without IRR entries, LOAs, and a bunch of paperwork. Others (such as AS31133, apparently) will accept any prefix you want and as many of 'em as you want.
I'll give (some of) the Tier 1's a bit of a break, as filtering on every single BGP session just isn't feasible (although some of them wouldn't bother filtering even if they could!). Pretty much everyone else should be filtering.
But they aren't. And they won't be any time soon. And so we'll continue to have incidents like this for the foreseeable future.
- pas 9y agoWhy can't higher Tier ISPs require that each prefix they get from downstream must be recorded in some DB and do the lookup before [propagating the prefix and] installing the forwarding table entries?
- topranks 9y agoThey generally do for their direct end-customers who announces their own address space. The problem is when peering with other Tier 1's and large ISPs, with multiple downstream customers. How do they keep and update a list of the other ISPs customers and the routes they should expect from them? Once someone manages to get a bogus route into a large ISPs table it tends to propagate further.