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I don't know what this book argues specifically, but the problem of color is very much a special case of the problem of qualia. If one takes a presumptuous and

I don't know what this book argues specifically, but the problem of color is very much a special case of the problem of qualia. If one takes a presumptuous and shallow view of science, one might be inclined to accept Galileo's characterization of color. However, that's just an accident of history and not the result of having comprehended some essential scientific fact concerning color. The invention and subsequent consignment of qualia (here, color) to conscious experience is the consequence not of scientific discovery, but of a metaphysics -- and a deeply flawed metaphysics at that -- that has been lurking in our thinking since Galileo and Descartes. That metaphysics proposes that the world is composed of two kinds of substances, namely, the material res extensa (things extended in space) and the immaterial res cogitans (for all intents and purposes, minds). What can not be attributed to res extensa (e.g., color) is attributed to minds, so really, when physicists talk about color, they are not speaking of color in conformity with the common understanding of color, but in terms of a redefinition of color. The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa. The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter. It is by definition impossible to locate color in matter given a Cartesian understanding of matter. Many physicists, in their more philosophical moments, tacitly accept a metaphysical position of that kind. What's important is that the modern understanding of color, one that attributes it to consciousness rather than things, is not a scientific position. It is a metaphysical position and a very problematic one that is running its course as philosophers and scientists try helplessly and in vain to explain things like consciousness and the objects of consciousness.

ChrisSD 9y ago
I'm not sure I understand your point? If I feel confused, that's a real physical thing. Sure we say emotions are in my mind but my mind is part of my whole body which is a physical thing we can touch and dissect (if not yet fully understand). Similarly my understanding and perception of the colours I see comes from a real physical body that has accumulated a lot of sensory input and experiences and uses that to interpret new sensory input. I can't explain to you how I experience the colour blue but I don't need to grapple with metaphysics to explain, in principle, why I might experience it that way.
- westoncb 9y ago
  Something that helped me understand why this problem is significant: the things you mention as giving an account of color perception are only accounting for a brain system which evolves through states having structure which is isomorphic to fluctuations of colors in subjective experience[0]. However, the philosophical question isn't about whether you can create such a mapping, it's about reconciling the fact that if you look around your environment it's like something, and what it's like is importantly not a bunch of neurons. And yet when we look inside brains, we only find neurons. So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction. [0] Another subtlety here is that the brain states having structure isomorphic to something in subjectivity doesn't necessarily make sense. It would on the assumption that everything is 'structural', but that's not an assumption everyone is willing to make. (You can find demonstrations that mathematics and the sciences can only deal in terms of structure, which is why for their practitioners it makes sense to ignore anything non-structural—but this is very different from a demonstration that everything actually is structural.) In that case, in order to create this mapping, we have to create another structure (for instance, a taxonomy of colors names and relationships between colors), and we can configure that structure in a way which is intended to reflect some moments of subjective experience. Now that structure could be potentially be found isomorphic to some evolving brain states, while to say that the subjective experience itself was isomorphic is likely nonsensical.
  - mannykannot 9y ago
    > So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction. I am reminded of an essay by Stephen Jay Gould, on the history of preformationism, and the debate over whether the homunculus resided in the sperm or the egg. The idea that a human could be represented by an ordering of simple chemicals was inconceivable at the time. The idea that physicalism requires a specific physical locus for redness is no more sound than the idea that genetic theory requires human-ness to be located in a specific base on a DNA molecule. Emergent phenomena are real, common, and not, in general, particularly mysterious (though the mind certainly is, at least to me.) More prosaically, maybe redness is actually localized, as a memory of a sensation. Is there anything more to redness than a comparison to prior sensations?
mannykannot 9y ago
Where does information fit into the Cartesian dichotomy?
pfranz 9y ago
It sounds like it's just an exploration of the history of color perception and philosophy of it. Scientists don't really have any problem; they all understand color is light emitted interacting with light reflected interacting with our light sensors (eyeballs). They're pretty good at measuring and recreating those elements. My guess though is, to your point about qualia, while we've scientifically categorized animals, plants, and minerals food is fairly subjective but many preferences are shared between people. We've also developed a rough language around food (sweet, sour, umami), and food scientists have studied it and tried recreating characteristics.
nitrogen 9y ago
The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter. What reformation is required here? Given how simulated neural networks tend to end up with particular neurons representing concepts, it should not be surprising if one could find neurons in the brain for colors. The experience of color is the combined effect of activation of those neurons.
- goofingaround 9y ago
  ... therefore, neural networks consciously experience color. QED
- goatlover 9y ago
  The experience of color isn't a concept.
analog31 9y ago
The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa. This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color. I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.

ChrisSD 9y ago

I'm not sure I understand your point? If I feel confused, that's a real physical thing. Sure we say emotions are in my mind but my mind is part of my whole body which is a physical thing we can touch and dissect (if not yet fully understand). Similarly my understanding and perception of the colours I see comes from a real physical body that has accumulated a lot of sensory input and experiences and uses that to interpret new sensory input. I can't explain to you how I experience the colour blue but I don't need to grapple with metaphysics to explain, in principle, why I might experience it that way.

westoncb 9y ago
Something that helped me understand why this problem is significant: the things you mention as giving an account of color perception are only accounting for a brain system which evolves through states having structure which is isomorphic to fluctuations of colors in subjective experience[0]. However, the philosophical question isn't about whether you can create such a mapping, it's about reconciling the fact that if you look around your environment it's like something, and what it's like is importantly not a bunch of neurons. And yet when we look inside brains, we only find neurons. So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction. [0] Another subtlety here is that the brain states having structure isomorphic to something in subjectivity doesn't necessarily make sense. It would on the assumption that everything is 'structural', but that's not an assumption everyone is willing to make. (You can find demonstrations that mathematics and the sciences can only deal in terms of structure, which is why for their practitioners it makes sense to ignore anything non-structural—but this is very different from a demonstration that everything actually is structural.) In that case, in order to create this mapping, we have to create another structure (for instance, a taxonomy of colors names and relationships between colors), and we can configure that structure in a way which is intended to reflect some moments of subjective experience. Now that structure could be potentially be found isomorphic to some evolving brain states, while to say that the subjective experience itself was isomorphic is likely nonsensical.
- mannykannot 9y ago
  > So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction. I am reminded of an essay by Stephen Jay Gould, on the history of preformationism, and the debate over whether the homunculus resided in the sperm or the egg. The idea that a human could be represented by an ordering of simple chemicals was inconceivable at the time. The idea that physicalism requires a specific physical locus for redness is no more sound than the idea that genetic theory requires human-ness to be located in a specific base on a DNA molecule. Emergent phenomena are real, common, and not, in general, particularly mysterious (though the mind certainly is, at least to me.) More prosaically, maybe redness is actually localized, as a memory of a sensation. Is there anything more to redness than a comparison to prior sensations?

mannykannot 9y ago

Where does information fit into the Cartesian dichotomy?

pfranz 9y ago

It sounds like it's just an exploration of the history of color perception and philosophy of it. Scientists don't really have any problem; they all understand color is light emitted interacting with light reflected interacting with our light sensors (eyeballs). They're pretty good at measuring and recreating those elements. My guess though is, to your point about qualia, while we've scientifically categorized animals, plants, and minerals food is fairly subjective but many preferences are shared between people. We've also developed a rough language around food (sweet, sour, umami), and food scientists have studied it and tried recreating characteristics.

nitrogen 9y ago

The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter. What reformation is required here? Given how simulated neural networks tend to end up with particular neurons representing concepts, it should not be surprising if one could find neurons in the brain for colors. The experience of color is the combined effect of activation of those neurons.

goofingaround 9y ago
... therefore, neural networks consciously experience color. QED
goatlover 9y ago
The experience of color isn't a concept.

analog31 9y ago

The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa. This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color. I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.