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From what I gathered by reading the whitepaper mass censorship is extremely hard to accomplish. >Could ISPs throttle or block IPFS content, for instance? They
by colemannugent 9y ago
From what I gathered by reading the whitepaper mass censorship is extremely hard to accomplish.
>Could ISPs throttle or block IPFS content, for instance?
They wouldn't know what was IPFS and what was regular encrypted TCP, the only way I can tell IPFS traffic apart in wireshark is the port number. Once ISPs start blockings random encrypted connections people will get mad when their games or other applications stop working.
If we are talking about bad actors in the IPFS network, I reccommend you read their whitepaper. They layout a clever karma based system for incentivizing nodes to help others and punishing nodes that misbehave.
- wanderingbort 9y ago> They wouldn't know what was IPFS and what was regular encrypted TCP The extreme conclusion of state-sponsored censorship is not a black list or DPI. It is a white list. It is easy to restrict traffic to a small set of addresses that are rigorously monitored for any ability to proxy non-conforming traffic. Everything else would get dropped on the floor. IPFS and the like sit too high in the OSI layers to combat state sponsored censorship in the long-run. It makes me wonder what the target market is. If this ever got big, it would just trigger the next step in the arms race it is incapable of sustaining
- hedora 9y agoI’d think it would support grafting in chunks of the merkle dag via usb drives, etc. Otherwise, I don’t understand the claims about disconnected operation and breaking the dependency on the internet backbone.