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One very important point in favor of paper based voting systems which often comes up on HN is that attacks against paper based voting are inherently not scalabl

One very important point in favor of paper based voting systems which often comes up on HN is that attacks against paper based voting are inherently not scalable, while electronic voting is prone to large scale attacks by a corrupt government or a determined and resourceful adversary. I used to be in favor of electronic voting, but after slowly learning more and more about how difficult it is to create secure system, I think voting is one place where we are not yet ready to digitise(if we ever will be).

Godel_unicode 9y ago
This is a false dichotomy. Read Matt's testimony. We can have immediate results and reduced errors from electronic voting while simultaneously having a perfect, affirmative paper record.
anigbrowl 9y ago
attacks against paper based voting are inherently not scalable Sure they are. Attacks against the counting are not, but you can easily attack the voters int heir heads by microtargeting of advertising, both electronic and in more traditional forms like paper mailers or street displays. You can't easily produce a particular outcome across a large population, but you don't need to; all you have to do is throw the integrity of the election into sufficient doubt that the political consensus breaks down and it's off to the races. And that is very very easy to do, as we have seen over and over again.
- enitihas 9y ago
  But all these attacks still remain possible with whatever electronic voting system you choose. So I don't see how electronic voting offers us any help here.
  - anigbrowl 9y ago
    I expanded on this in greater detail in one of my other comments and omitted to mention it again here, sorry. In addition to forcing a close vote by whatever means, you then attack the integrity of the ballot-counting process at the local level. This is easy to do in a a paper-based system because of the information asymmetry that exists from voting precincts; you don't know much about the integrity of the vote in any other precinct besides your own, and likely not even in that unless you're really interested. On the other hand, you know a lot about the general integrity of electronic transactions because you probably use a credit or debit card frequently and in many different places and contexts and it works predictably. So even though that system isn't that secure, enough people believe in it through repetition and general utility that it remains in place. Voting is infrequent and thus easier to get up conspiracy theories about.
forapurpose 9y ago
> after slowly learning more and more about how difficult it is to create secure system It's an IT problem that many at HN should understand. Secure this system against potential nation state attackers who are highly motivated: * System is distributed across locations in every county in the nation * System is actually a variety of different systems, not built to any standard or spec (AFAIK). * Software and hardware are not audited or known to be secure. Much of it is well past it's designed lifetime. Level of maintenance varies, but is probably low on average. * System is operated by amateurs, often volunteers, a different group of them in every location. Operators have a variety of training, but often very little and often minimal security training. Operators are not vetted. * Physical security is minimal. Also, up to 180 million users are given private, physical access to the system. ... Obviously, it's an absurdly impossible task. To any degree that it is possible, the expense would be so high that paper would be the obvious choice.

Godel_unicode 9y ago

This is a false dichotomy. Read Matt's testimony. We can have immediate results and reduced errors from electronic voting while simultaneously having a perfect, affirmative paper record.

anigbrowl 9y ago

attacks against paper based voting are inherently not scalable Sure they are. Attacks against the counting are not, but you can easily attack the voters int heir heads by microtargeting of advertising, both electronic and in more traditional forms like paper mailers or street displays. You can't easily produce a particular outcome across a large population, but you don't need to; all you have to do is throw the integrity of the election into sufficient doubt that the political consensus breaks down and it's off to the races. And that is very very easy to do, as we have seen over and over again.

enitihas 9y ago
But all these attacks still remain possible with whatever electronic voting system you choose. So I don't see how electronic voting offers us any help here.
- anigbrowl 9y ago
  I expanded on this in greater detail in one of my other comments and omitted to mention it again here, sorry. In addition to forcing a close vote by whatever means, you then attack the integrity of the ballot-counting process at the local level. This is easy to do in a a paper-based system because of the information asymmetry that exists from voting precincts; you don't know much about the integrity of the vote in any other precinct besides your own, and likely not even in that unless you're really interested. On the other hand, you know a lot about the general integrity of electronic transactions because you probably use a credit or debit card frequently and in many different places and contexts and it works predictably. So even though that system isn't that secure, enough people believe in it through repetition and general utility that it remains in place. Voting is infrequent and thus easier to get up conspiracy theories about.

forapurpose 9y ago

> after slowly learning more and more about how difficult it is to create secure system It's an IT problem that many at HN should understand. Secure this system against potential nation state attackers who are highly motivated: * System is distributed across locations in every county in the nation * System is actually a variety of different systems, not built to any standard or spec (AFAIK). * Software and hardware are not audited or known to be secure. Much of it is well past it's designed lifetime. Level of maintenance varies, but is probably low on average. * System is operated by amateurs, often volunteers, a different group of them in every location. Operators have a variety of training, but often very little and often minimal security training. Operators are not vetted. * Physical security is minimal. Also, up to 180 million users are given private, physical access to the system. ... Obviously, it's an absurdly impossible task. To any degree that it is possible, the expense would be so high that paper would be the obvious choice.